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Abstract
To what extent does the opposition to planned demolition of New Orleans' public housing
engage leadership and participation across race and class lines? In the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) announced plans to demolish 5,000 of
the city's 7,000 public housing units. On the surface a diverse array of activists oppose the plan;
however, it is unclear how these anti-demolition forces organize themselves, what their
objectives are beyond the near term, and whether they empower politically marginalized public
housing residents. This thesis addresses those issues, and more broadly examines the challenges
of participatory planning and decision making in a post-disaster context. I use a case study
approach centered on interviews with key informants and a survey of key media coverage. I draw
on a scholarly literature to ground my assessment in models of "empowered participation."
First, to frame my investigation in New Orleans' distant and recent past, I explore the city's
development history, the growth of public housing, and the post-Katrina struggle to save
threatened units. This discussion explains some of the pre- and post-storm relationships between
public housing and social stratification. Second, using informant interviews and media accounts,
I analyze the current anti-demolition effort. Rather than a unitary movement, I find three
coalitions intersecting in their mutual opposition to the demolition plans but not collaborating
with each other; I identify a set of push/pull factors that hold the coalitions together internally but
divide them externally from one another; and I find that despite appearances, leadership and
decision making power are allocated along race and class lines that exclude residents from the
debate. Third, I identify four reasons for residents' absence from the activism and its leadership:
residents remain largely absent physically from the city, they have more immediate concerns
than public housing advocacy, and they hold a variety of perspectives on the demolition issue,
and the opposition effort is not structured to facilitate their participation.
For now at least, the opposition to public housing demolition does not engage leadership and
participation across race and class lines to include residents. But how much participation should
we expect? I conclude by comparing the enormous and unusual constraints of the post-disaster
setting to examples from the literature on participatory planning and decision-making and the
literature on public housing activism and resident-led struggles. Ultimately I find that anti-
demolition advocates currently fail to engage diverse perspectives and leadership, but also that
any meaningful measure must evaluate not only actions but context and time as well.
Thesis Advisor: Xavier de Souza Briggs
Title: Associate Professor of Sociology and Urban Planning
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Chapter One: Introduction
By all accounts Hurricane Katrina was a window for the American public into the unexpected.
The buildup to the storm was familiar with a satellite feed of a slickered reporter shouting live,
above whipping rain and wind. But quickly, media attention turned to the unusual scope of the
devastation. Gushing levees gave way to grandmothers and children stranded on rooftops, which
in turn gave way to surreal images of tens of thousands of New Orleanians stuck in the fetid New
Orleans Convention Center and Superdome.
Almost immediately public discourse extended beyond the scope of the natural disaster to
include critiques of the images of ineptitude, chaos and neglect. In the words of anthropologists
Rachel Breunlin and Helen Regis, "a larger public discussion developed in the newspapers and
on television about the poverty that the storm exposed and how it was entangled with race. No
longer was the discussion about what went so wrong with New Orleans levees and the rescue
operation that followed after they failed, but what went wrong before the storm." (Breunlin and
Regis, 2006)
Public discussion locates the source of the city's failures in entrenched poverty and racial
segregation (Iyengar and Morin, Washington Post, June 8, 2006). Thus, conversations about how
to build a new New Orleans revolve around a process and an outcome that de-concentrates
poverty and promotes integration across racial and economic lines. Initially discussions of how
to achieve this included diverse perspectives. But voices advocating for top down solutions
dominated the conversation. They called for systematic relocation of public housing residents
and mixed-income redevelopments of public housing projects (Berube and Katz, October, 2005).
New Orleans' public housing is a favorite touchstone in the crusade to integrate the poorest black
residents into the larger city. Politicians ranging from city council members to the secretary of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) argue that the physical
isolation and concentration of the Housing Authority of New Orleans' (HANO) all black
(Quigley, Mitchell and Washington, 2006, 11), low-income resident population isolates and dis-
empowers residents, limiting their educational and career opportunities and fostering drugs,
crime and other social ills. This explanation closely parallels William Julius Wilson's analysis of
the urban underclass and the ways in which traditional social services and welfare only
reproduce, rather than alleviate poverty (Wilson, 1987). On these grounds, HUD and HANO are
advocating for a plan that would demolish four of the city's ten public housing complexes,
comprising 5,000 of a total 7,000 units, and redevelop the sites as mixed-income communities.
Interestingly, the same rhetoric fueling HUD and HANO's argument is the basis for an effort to
prevent the planned demolition and redevelopment. Opponents of the plan claim that it will
displace rather than re-integrate public housing residents, preventing some from returning to
New Orleans altogether and removing the rest from their communities and support systems.
They argue that scattering residents in this way will only exacerbate the disempowerment and
isolation that result from entrenched poverty and racial segregation.
Beyond the nuance of this counter argument, the anti-demolition effort is also notable for its
apparent embodiment of racial and class integration. In the year since HUD and HANO
announced their intent to demolish, a diverse array of advocates voiced opposition to the plans.
Radical white activists, black public housing residents, civil rights attorneys from New Orleans
and elsewhere, local tourism industry magnates, and regional and national journalists and
intellectuals all spoke out against the demolitions. In a city often characterized as black and
white, shades of gray emerged in the diverse political and experiential perspectives present.
Thus, this thesis poses the question: In its organization, decision making and actions, does the
anti-demolition effort actually engage diverse perspectives and leadership from across class
and race boundaries?
To answer this question, I explore the social, political and economic histories that have shaped
New Orleans. I examine the impact of Hurricane Katrina and the way it defines the current
debate over public housing. I survey what factors have led members to involvement in the anti-
demolition effort. I map the ideology, strategy and goals of the effort. And finally I analyze how
the power to define the agenda and make critical decisions is allocated within the effort.
Methodology
I base this investigation on personal experiences, participant interviews, a literature review, news
and other accounts from New Orleans. Essential contextual and background information comes
from the literature review and my personal perspectives. I use news media, public, government
and administrative documents and other New Orleans-specific readings to build a critical
timeline. Interview responses shape my characterization of the effort, its members and the
distribution of power and decision making. And finally, I use the literature review to develop my
analytical framework.
My personal experiences come from a year spent in post Katrina New Orleans. I first arrived in
New Orleans in December, 2005 and stayed until June, 2006. After a hiatus from New Orleans, I
returned again in September, 2006 and stayed until the end of December, 2006.
When I first got to New Orleans I worked as a consultant for a small, progressive, faith-based
foundation headquartered in Massachusetts. I was hired, along with a small team of MIT
graduate students, to survey community groups and leaders about their experiences organizing in
post-Katrina New Orleans, about their critical needs at that time, and about their compliments
and critiques of post-Katrina philanthropic giving thus far. The position allowed me to interact
with dozens of the most important community organizers and organizations in the city, while
also communicating their perspectives to a wider philanthropic community.
The relationships I built working for the foundation served me well in my subsequent position as
a policy analyst from September through December of 2006. I worked for a locally-based
organization focused on affordable housing advocacy. In the wake of the storm with significant
policy decisions up in the air, I worked to inform and engage marginalized communities in these
civic processes.
I first noticed the anti-demolition effort during my first stint in New Orleans. I attended a Martin
Luther King Day rally and march to demand that the housing authority re-open the city's
shuttered public housing complexes. The event was attended by a diverse group of activists and
advocates. Even with less than a month in New Orleans under my belt, I immediately wondered
at the racial integration I saw at the event: the crowd ran contrary to my expectations of strict
racial segregation.
Over the course of my year in New Orleans I started to understand the complex race and class
relationships that support segregation in some situations, while encouraging surprising
interaction and cooperation in others. This thesis is an extension of my growing awareness and
interest in these dynamics.
Later in this thesis I quote from interviews I held with participants and observers of the anti-
demolition effort. In total I conducted six formal interviews with participants in New Orleans
during a research visit in July, 2007. I identified these participants through personal connections
developed over my time in New Orleans, and through the referrals of these connections.
Six is obviously a limited number of informants to conduct any in depth statistical analysis. But
in this case, I chose interviewees carefully. The individuals I quote are either leaders within each
of the three coalitions discussed later, or knowledgeable observers. Although they do not
necessarily represent the full spectrum of member views, as leaders and observers they usually
articulate the dominant views in each coalition.
Given that the public housing debate is ongoing and highly political, I choose not to publicly
identify my informants. Nevertheless, some relevant identity information will help the reader
understand the experiences and context from which the interviewees speak. In sum I interviewed
six subjects: three white subjects and three black subjects. Of the three black subjects, one was
Creole of color; the ethnic and social implications of this designation will be discussed further in
the next chapter. Overall, I interviewed four women and two men. I did not ask interviewees'
ages, but I estimate that all of my subjects ranged from 40-60.
To help the reader follow individual perspectives, I assign each interviewee a number and use
these when citing our conversations; whenever possible, I also include some other reminder of
what role or vantage the person is speaking from. In terms of interviewees' roles in the effort, I
met with one African American Attorney knowledgeable about the federal case against HANO
and HUD (Interviewee 6). I met with one locally prominent business and political leader
(Interviewee 1). I met with two radical white activists (Interviewees 3 and 4), and one resident
who has been active in the community advocacy faction (Interviewee 2). And I met with one
local journalist well versed in New Orleans' public housing issues (Interviewee 5).
Without exception, I conducted the interviews in New Orleans. For the most part, I asked my
subjects to suggest a location; we met in coffee shops, restaurants, park benches and community
centers. With permission from the subjects, I tape recorded three of the interviews; for the other
three, I rely on notes I took during and after the interviews.
In addition to interviews, my sense of the effort stems from a dozen or so public meetings,
rallies, hearings and press conferences I attended. Since this is ostensibly an open public effort,
meetings are often the place where agendas are formally set and decisions are made. While in
New Orleans this July, I attended three such meetings; out of interest and work responsibilities
during my year in New Orleans, I attended approximately ten such meetings. In addition to
meetings, rallies, hearings and press conferences constitute other significant events within the
effort; over the course of my year in New Orleans I attended at least six such events stemming
directly from the anti-demolition effort.
Beyond personal experiences and direct engagement with participants, I use written material in
the form of scholarly literature, news reports and other accounts from New Orleans to direct my
analysis. Scholarly literature includes journal articles, books, and other writing. News comes in
the form of both written and video/audio recorded reports. And other accounts of New Orleans
include legal briefs, blogs and administrative documents from various organizations.
This thesis relies at different points on three main bodies of scholarly literature. To establish a
larger cultural and social context, I focus on histories of New Orleans. I use the literature on
public housing organizing and conflicts around redevelopment schemes to understand the nature
of the political battle in New Orleans. And to create a rubric for evaluating the effort, I
incorporate literature on participatory planning and civic engagement.
I further divide history of New Orleans into three sub categories. Literature on the confluence of
New Orleans' geophysical and social realities helps contextualize settlement patterns and extant
racial and social hierarchies in the city. Richard Campanella's Time and Place in New Orleans
(2002) and Geographies of New Orleans (2006), Pierce F. Lewis' New Orleans: The Making of
an Urban Landscape, Second Ed. (2003), Beverly Hendrix Wright's essay "New Orleans: A City
That Care Forgot" in Robert D. Bullard's (ed.) In Search of the New South: The Black Urban
Experience in the 1970s and 1980s (1989) and Louise McKinney's New Orleans: A Cultural
History (2006) all present strong geophysical and cultural histories. Literature on New Orleans'
public housing helps to set the scene for the current public housing battle, and helps the reader to
visualize the actual contested neighborhoods. For this information, I return to Lewis and
Wright's accounts of New Orleans. Literature about Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath makes
sense of the physical, governmental and fiscal conditions under which the current conflict is
taking place. Here I look to a variety of sources, including Douglas Brinkley's The Great
Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast (2006).
Understanding the broader policy and organizing context of public housing across the country is
also essential. Larry Vale's From The Puritans to the Projects (2000) and Bauman, Biles and
Szylvian's (eds.) From Tenements to Taylor Homes: In Search of an Urban Housing Policy in
Twentieth-Century America (2000) both describe the evolution of housing policy. For parallel
cases, I mine Sudhir Venkatesh's American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto
(2000), Rhonda Williams' The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women's Struggles Against
Urban Inequality (2004), Lawrence Vale's Reclaiming Public Housing: A Half Century of
Struggle in Three Public Neighborhoods (2002), and Feldman and Stall's The Dignity of
Resistance: Women Residents' Activism in Chicago Public Housing (2005).
Finally, participation is at the crux of this discussion; and participation literature creates a rubric
for evaluation of the effort. I look to Xavier de Souza Briggs' Community Problem Solving
Tools (2003-5) for a critical discussion of participation strategies. For case studies in empowered
participation, I use Archon Fung's Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy
(2004). To understand the evolution of thought on participatory planning, I look to Sherry
Arnstein's "A Ladder of Citizen Participation" from the Journal of the American Institute of
Planning (1969) and Richard S. Bolan's "Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of
Planning" also from the Journal of the American Institute of Planning (1969). And for a window
into disaster-specific challenges I look to various essays in Vale and Campanella's (eds.) The
Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster (2005).
Overview
This thesis is an exploration of a political effort and its relationship to the race and class
hierarchies at work in New Orleans. I begin by constructing a context for this discussion. I
outline early settlement of New Orleans and the racialized implications for its residents. I place
the rise and fall of the city's public housing system against the backdrop of federal policy
changes and local economic and population shifts. I look at the impact of Hurricane Katrina, and
offer a timeline of the public-housing related decisions and actions since the storm.
I then analyze the way the anti-demolition effort is organized. Based upon interview and
observational data, I characterize various strains within the effort. I explore issues of credibility
and legitimacy, in the context of identity, strategy and rhetoric.
I follow with an in-depth analysis of resident presence and perspective in the anti-demolition
effort. I examine the capacities in which some residents are active in the effort. And I explore
why some residents participate, and why others don't.
To conclude my exploration, I examine findings in the context of the larger rebuilding effort and
participatory processes in New Orleans. I use extant models of participation to evaluate the anti-
demolition effort's engagement of diverse participation and leadership. I consider the relevance
of these models by comparing and contrasting the situation in New Orleans with other public
housing struggles. I investigate the post-disaster challenges and how the effort sometimes tries to
overcome them, while other at times uses them as justification for ignoring resident voices and
power. Finally, I argue for an ongoing and tailored evaluation of the effort that takes into
consideration the constraints of the present, the possibilities of the future, and shifting
relationships and interests over time.
I conclude by drawing some final observations about the current effort's successes and failures at
promoting diverse engagement. However, ultimately I argue that any meaningful or honest
assessment must evaluate not only present actions but the impacts of context and time as well.
Chapter Two: Cultural and Historical Background
New Orleanians often brag about the uniqueness of their city; as it turns out, their claim is more
than just an empty boast. New Orleans followed a truly unusual path that brought about unique
social and cultural results. The city's complex history of slavery and shifting colonialism brought
about multi-tiered race and class distinctions. As the city grew, both social and settlement
patterns were highly influenced by these locally recognized categories.
In recent decades, population shifts and decentralization have collided with the city's racialized
histories to produce an uncommon twist on the common urban processes of white flight and
suburbanization. With economic downturn, extant race and class divides have deepened. And the
intervention of Hurricane Katrina in August, 2005 revealed the impact and implications of these
rifts on service provision and government support.
This chapter summarizes some of New Orleans' history relevant to race and class distinctions. It
focuses particularly on public housing, and later outlines the current post-Katrina debate over the
institution. In the following chapter, this debate and the anti-demolition effort will get further
attention. This chapter's descriptions thus function as a rough timeline to inform reading of later
chapters.
Race, Class and the Built Environment
New Orleans evolved physically and culturally along a somewhat different trajectory than most
other American cities. New Orleans was first settled by the French in 1722, and after shifting
from French to Spanish hands and back again, it was finally ceded to the Americans as part of
the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. The cultural and physical shape that New Orleans takes is an
agglomeration of these three competing cultures, further impacted by trade ties to the Caribbean
and the cultural influence of the generations of African slaves who passed through the slave
markets of New Orleans.
By 1810 New Orleans ranked as the nation's fifth largest city, outpaced only by the "four East
Coast giants", New York City, Philadelphia, Boston and Baltimore (Lewis, 2003, 43). New
Orleans' booming imports and exports, and the city's status as the nation's busiest slave market
made it the "most prosperous city in the history of the South" (McKinney, 2006, 21).
Accordingly, unlike those other northern cities, New Orleans was a predominately black
metropolis; the U.S. census of 1810 counted 8,000 whites, 10,824 slaves and 5,727 free blacks
(Wright, 1989, 46).
The sizeable free black population comprised mostly of mixed-race Creoles of color. These
Creoles typically shared lighter complexions and French heritage; they spoke either formal or a
Patois French. By the early 1 9th century this growing demographic had secured many of the
rights and freedoms afforded white New Orleanians. As such, they often held property, owned
businesses, sought formal education, and at times amassed great wealth (McKinney, 2006).
The fall of slavery and the post-reconstruction institution of racist Jim Crow laws stripped
Creoles of many of these rights and privileges that distinguished them from other African
Americans. However, to this day the subtle social and cultural differences between the two
groups remain fundamentally salient to most New Orleanians of color. These differences are
made visibly manifest in distinctions in physical appearance, and religious affiliation (Creoles
are typically Roman Catholics owing to their French backgrounds, whereas other African
Americans are more likely to be Protestants) (McKinney, 2006). Economic and class disparities
between Creoles and African Americans persist as well. Many of the most powerful blacks in the
city claim Creole heritage including all four African American mayors in the city's history and
the majority of black city council members.
New Orleans' social history is written onto the city's contemporary geography as well. The basic
layout of the city follows an arpent system. During the French colonial period, plantation lots
were valued based upon two limited resources: access to the river and access to well-drained
arable land. In an effort to ensure even distribution of these resources, plantation owners' lots
were measured by frontage along the river, and then extended back in wedge shaped plots along
the valuable high ground and down into the swamps behind (Campanella, 2002, 50).
The developed residential portion of the city, which was confined to the present day French
Quarter as late as 1800 (Lewis, 2003) began to encroach on plantations and by the outbreak of
the Civil War in 1863 had largely developed the lots (Lewis, 2003). The large farm lots were
subdivided along the existing grids. Property lines running back from the river became the city's
prominent boulevards, a handful of other grand avenues were cut parallel to the river to carry
traffic between these streets, and slowly smaller roads filled the spaces in between.
Prior to the Civil War, but especially with emancipation these building patterns brought about
unusual patterns of racial distribution in the city. After the war, New Orleans' wealthiest white
families built homes along the city's avenues and boulevards. While they no longer housed
slaves on their grounds, the households continued to require servants and other workers in close
proximity. As a result the smaller streets and alleys between the city's lavish thoroughfares
became home to the city's mostly black craft and service sectors. (Lewis, 2003, 51)
The resulting geography appeared as a collection of "superblocks" bordered by affluent white
boulevards, with increasingly black centers (Lewis, 2003, 51). This pattern has dissolved to some
extent over the years, though it generated an enduring checkerboard pattern of racial
concentration. Although blocks are often entirely black or entirely white, they are also typically
in close proximity to more racially diverse areas.
After the Civil War, New Orleans' black population grew and shifted dramatically. Recently
emancipated blacks from New Orleans and across the Deep South filled in the cores of these
superblocks, as well as 'back-of-town' settlement in undesirable land along the swampy edge of
the city opposite the river. This boom in settlement opportunities for some, was tempered by
curtailed opportunities for others. The institution of racist Jim Crow laws stripped Creoles of
much of the property they had once dominated in the French Quarter. As a result they fled into
the neighboring Sixth Ward. Both this area of the Sixth Ward now known as the Treme, and
some of the back-of-town neighborhoods now comprising Central City and parts of Mid-City
endure today as black social centers and (with varying degrees of prosperity) as hubs of black
commercial life (Wright, 1989, 47).
New Orleans was quick to rebound from the upheaval of the Civil War; the city's population
continued to grow through the first decades of the twentieth century. The onset of World War I
slowed residential construction, and brought an influx of both black and white workers to fill
defense jobs (Wright, 1989, 48). The ensuing population surge and construction slow down
generated a housing bottleneck which resulted in a post-war push to suburbanize on the urban
fringes. A growing network of streetcars and the 1917 invention of the Wood pump, a heavy
duty pumping system that could remove water from swampy areas making them suitable for
building, allowed for general expansion into the formerly undesirable back-of-town areas once
relegated to poor blacks (Wright, 1989, 48-9).
Despite the economic and residential growth, the city struggled to house working class people;
the depression illuminated this challenge. Stringent economic times and foresighted local
politicians coincided with policy shifts on a national level. "Advanced planning allowed New
Orleans to be one of the first cities to receive funding under the Wagner act of 1937" (Wright,
1989, 54), a federal housing allotment set aside for the construction of the nation's first federally
funded public housing developments.
Over the next three decades, the city would build over 14,000 public housing units. Government
rhetoric surrounding early construction of these units insisted that social welfare be made
available to the deserving poor (Vale, 200 and Lewis, 2003). As housing policy and the local and
national economy changed over time, so too did the intent and outcomes associated with New
Orleans' public housing.
At its inception, public housing was segregated but provided for both white and black residents
(Lewis, 2003, 133). The units were envisioned as short-term support for families temporarily
affected by poverty. Strict admission policies ensured that tenants came from intact families with
one or more working adults (Lewis, 2003, 133).
But beginning with integration in the 1960s, the demographics of the city began to change.
Federally mandated integration of public schools prompted many white New Orleanians to shift
their children to parochial schools and residentially concentrate around the almost entirely white
Audubon/University District and in the newly developed Lakefront Neighborhoods (Lewis,
2003, 143). And for middle and working class whites who lacked the resources for private
education, suburban growth permitted by improved flood control technologies in Jefferson and
St. Bernard Parishes offered more affordable ways to resist integration in schools and
neighborhoods (Lewis, 2003, 138).
While whites moved out of the inner city towards a few neighborhoods in Orleans Parish and
beyond towards the suburbs, middle class blacks engaged in a similar shuffling within the city.
The same technologies that allowed development in swampy areas of neighboring parishes, also
created development opportunities in lower lying areas in Orleans Parish. The development of
Gentilly and Eastern New Orleans between the 1960s and the 1980s offered moneyed blacks a
way to move out of the inner city and towards a more suburban lifestyle as well (Lewis, 2003,
136).
Despite the intentions of integration, it produced a more segregated New Orleans (Lewis, 2003,
126). Post-1960s, whites isolated themselves in suburbs and in a few Orleans Parish enclaves,
middle-class blacks moved towards suburban-style development within the parish, and poor
blacks were left in highly concentrated neighborhoods in the inner city (Lewis, 2003, 127). In
addition, as a result of black middle-class flight towards new areas at the edge of town, many
black-owned businesses in the inner city departed along with their owners. This left historic
black shopping districts such as Freret Street, North Claiborne and St. Claude pocked with
vacant storefronts, and left the remaining residents without adequate access to services and
consumer goods (Lewis, 2003, 136).
Despite geographic shifts, the city remained relatively economically prosperous, as a number of
middle and upper middle class residents remained within the Parish, if segregated from the
lower-wage neighbors. New Orleans remained a significant port and home to the region's
booming petroleum trade. As such, commerce and tax revenues remained active in the city
(Lewis, 2003, 107).
This changed, however, with the oil bust of the 1980s. Overnight, oil companies uprooted their
corporate offices--headquartered in the city for decades--and either closed up shop entirely or
relocated to Houston (Lewis, 2003, 123). As a result, the city lost many of its successful
professionals who were either laid off or forced to relocate with their companies. The loss of this
professional class marked a major shift in municipal tax revenues as both high wage earners and
the flow of commerce and production they generated dried up (Lewis, 2003, 124).
The effect of the relocation quickly trickled down to New Orleanians who had no direct
connection to corporate oil. Without tax revenues, public services suffered. The already
beleaguered school system descended further. Public health and welfare facilities shut their
doors. And the maintenance and functionality of public housing abruptly declined (Lewis, 2003,
129).
In the late 80s and early 90s, the city attempted to inject its overabundance of unskilled labor and
seamy reputation into the sagging tourism industry (Lewis, 2003, 128). The city saw a jazz
revival. The French Quarter was cleaned up and police patrols were increased and casinos,
luxury hotels and a new convention center all served to bolster the effort (Lewis, 2003, 128).
While the effort buoyed the local economy to some extent, poverty remained a serious problem
both to households and to the city itself. Although the area had successfully traded corporate oil
for tourism, the two industries were not interchangeable (Lewis, 2003, 161). While both
provided jobs, employment in the tourism industry was unskilled, low wage work lacking in
stability or benefits. And with diminished tax returns, the city itself was poorer than it had been,
and city services--especially those offered to the poor--suffered further. The local government,
long criticized for its corruption, seemed ever less able to care for its most vulnerable
constituents.
It was towards this city--one third poor, two thirds black, largely dependent upon service sector
employment (Brinkley, 2006, 32)--that Katrina spun at the end of August, 2005. In the days
leading up to the storm the mayor Ray Nagin--concerned about potential revenue losses on the
thousands of tourists in New Orleans renting hotel rooms, buying meals, listening to music on
business and pleasure trips; and still ridiculed for evacuating the city the previous year on
account of a hurricane that never came--failed to evacuate the city.
When Nagin finally called a mandatory evacuation, less than 12 hours before the first rain from
Katrina began to fall on the city (Brinkley, 2006, 626-7), there was barely time for resourced
New Orleanians to escape. Those with cars and credit cards boarded up their windows, packed
their things and left. But for the nearly one in four New Orleanians without any access to a car
(Brinkley, 2006, 626), for those without credit cards or extra cash, for the cleaning staff and
restaurant workers retained to serve the city's fully booked hotels, the mayor's announcement--
without any free, publicly available transportation to escape the city (Brinkley, 2006, 91)--came
far too late to plan an evacuation.
Of course this storm, unlike Ivan the year before, did affect New Orleans. Despite an eye that
remained more than 15 miles from the city, levee breaches, storm surge and stalled pumping
stations inundated New Orleans. The world watched as water cascaded through neighborhoods,
as women and children clung to rooftops and tree branches, and--perhaps most horrifying--as
over fifty thousand New Orleanians waited for nearly a week without food, water, medical
attention or police protection, to be evacuated from the Superdome, Convention Center, freeway
overpasses and other islands of high ground (Brinkley, 2006, 627).
As the dust settled, the nation took stock of the damage to peoples' properties and lives. Expert
surveys and university studies would tell us that over 80% of the homes in the city were flooded
(Logan, 2006 and Berube and Katz, October, 2006). They would describe differentiated affects
on minorities and the poor (Logan, 2006 and Berube and Katz, October, 2006). And without any
particular awareness of the singularity of race, class and history in New Orleans, they would
offer analysis and policy directives. While New Orleanians remained in exile in Houston, Baton
Rouge and Atlanta, pundits from every discipline heralded the possibility of a new New Orleans,
written upon what they saw as the blank slate left by the storm.
Public Housing in New Orleans
Like many public housing authorities across the country, the Housing Authority of New Orleans
(HANO) adapted over the years to different political climates, funding schedules, clienteles and
architectural styles. At its birth, HANO was the bearer of a new social optimism that rang in the
end of the depression, and the economic boom of World War II and beyond. Soon after, it stood
at the crosshairs of the battle for integration of public institutions. Over the last decades, HANO
suffered along with the rest of the city as a result of economic downturn, disinvestment, growing
poverty and dwindling city coffers. More recently, under the wing of the federal government,
HANO has worked to winnow its managerial responsibilities, bringing in private developers to
revamp and repopulate public housing properties with mixed-income residents. And in the nearly
two years since the storm, HANO has engaged in a battle over the fate of the majority of its
units, properties and residents.
The Housing Authority of New Orleans was established in 1937 to manage the federal funding
offered through the Wagner Act. In 1938 plans for the first two public housing developments--St.
Thomas (now River Gardens), and Magnolia (now C.J. Peete)--were approved by the authority.
By the end of 1941 five developments with over 4,000 units were opened. (Wright, 1989 55-6)
Site selection for the new developments varied. Some critics describe public housing locations as
isolated--cut off from the rest of the city by railroad lines and tracts of vacant or industrial land
(Wright, 1989 56). But others describe public housing as centrally located, convenient for the
working class residents many of whom did not own their own vehicles (Brinkley, 2006, 53).
With ten developments by 1965, both assessments are true in some cases.
The St. Thomas and Magnolia developments were located amid existing residential and
commercial areas. They were built as part of early urban renewal efforts on land cleared of
residential neighborhoods deemed 'slums'. Similarly, the Lafitte and Iberville developments
replaced Storyville, the city's decaying vice district (Wright, 1989, 56). As such, these four
developments are centrally located in areas of the city accessible by foot, car and public
transportation.
The Calliope development (now B.W. Cooper) was built on undesirable land near an industrial
area and is still today flanked by elevated roadways and industrial warehouses though it is
relatively centrally located and easily accessed by public transportation. The St. Bernard, Desire
(now Abundance Square) and Florida projects were built behind railroad tracks and warehouses,
and in the intervening decades of freeway construction and the elimination of the Desire streetcar
line, the latter two became even more isolated from the rest of the city. The St. Bernard, on the
other hand, ended up in a residentially and commercially populous location as black
suburbanization came to fill in the vacant and industrial properties surrounding the development
(Wright, 1989 56).
Thus, different developments face very different location specific situations. While some are
intimately connected to their residential and commercial surroundings, others are effectively cut
off. However, these relative differences have not greatly impacted the contemporary choices
HUD and HANO are making about which developments merit demolition and mixed-income
redevelopment.
In the early days of New Orleans' public housing, the apartments offered a sense of
neighborhood to employed, working class families. Despite the relative isolation of some
complexes, residents were "supported by a network of social services, from nursery schools
financed by the Works Progress Administration to onsite medical care, adult education programs,
Boy Scout groups and gardening clubs." (Ouroussoff, New York Times, November 19, 2006).
New Orleans public housing predates developments in many other cities which were built
primarily after World War II. As a result, they are architecturally quite different from later
construction. Unlike the "anonymous concrete blocks" dotting cities like Chicago (Ouroussoff,
2006), New Orleans' early developments were modeled after late 19th century Garden-City style
construction. As such they were characterized by tree-lined streets and communal courtyards.
They were built to fit the scale of surrounding neighborhoods, and often extended the street
grids, through a combination of automobile and foot paths, throughout the complexes.
(Ouroussoff, 2006).
As white flight took hold of New Orleans in the 1960s and the middle class fled the city,
however, they took their tax dollars with them. Funding for supportive services and facilities
maintenance dried up and life in the developments declined (Ouroussoff, 2006). Also during this
period federally mandated integration spread to public housing developments as well. With
integration of the projects, even poor whites found their way to the neighboring suburban
parishes, leaving New Orleans' housing projects nearly 100% African American (Lewis, 2003,
97-8).
Over the next several decades, other changes in welfare and housing policy, and nationwide
deindustrialization led to a public housing population comprising increasingly of the elderly, the
disabled and underemployed single female heads of household and their dependents (Lewis,
2003, 133). With limited educational and economic opportunities for blacks in New Orleans, the
public housing projects became homes to multiple generations from the same families.
In addition to generational poverty, during the 1980s and 1990s HANO developments became
notorious for violent crime. Although some accounts point to criminality festering among
residents (Lewis, 2003, 133), locals are often quick to observe that public housing residents are
mostly old people, women and children; whereas criminals are typically young men. A
politically prominent member of the business and preservation coalition offered the alternative
view that public housing developments came to be known as places that were under or un-
patrolled by the police and thus, attracting the gang and drug activity that spawns violent crimes
(Interview 1, 2007).
Regardless of the catalyzing forces, violence reached more profoundly into resident populations
in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the housing authority undertook redevelopment of the St.
Thomas project. Located atop the Mississippi's natural levees, in close proximity to the Garden
District and the now booming Convention Center and Warehouse District, the St. Thomas had
become a real estate liability. The city saw the potential for serious financial gain as well as the
opportunity to offload managerial responsibility for the beleaguered project in the form of the
federal HOPE VI program (Lewis, 2003, 135).
Through HOPE VI, HANO contracted with a private real estate developer to demolish the
existing buildings, and construct in their place a sprawling Wal-Mart surrounded by River
Gardens, a mixed-income community consisting of 1-4 unit homes for buyers, market rate
renters, subsidized renters, and a few of the extremely low income renters who had called St.
Thomas home before. A protracted legal and rhetorical battle ensued between residents,
developers, preservationists and the city: residents wanted one for one replacement of units
reserved for extremely low income renters, and wanted first right of refusal after the
redevelopment was complete (Lewis, 2003, 135).
While they wrangled over the details, the housing authority went forward with demolition of
most of the buildings, relocating thousands of residents into open units at B.W. Cooper and St.
Bernard. The resulting redevelopment, which eliminated 1,500 ACC units, consisted of 1,142
new units running the gamut from luxury condominiums to assisted care facilities, and only 337
units reserved for ACC renters (Lewis, 2003, 135). The relocation of St. Thomas residents,
meanwhile, sparked a violent crime wave, especially in the St. Bernard development where the
newcomers clashed with St. Bernard gangs over drug turf (Brinkley, 2006, 53).
The spiraling violence, diminished quality of life within the developments, and the decrepit
conditions of buildings themselves led the federal department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to place HANO in an administrative receivership in 2002 (Lewis, 2003,
134). Nevertheless, residents saw few improvements in their day to day lives. Although the
temporary shift of power was eventually set to expire, Katrina has prolonged HUD's control over
the authority indefinitely.
The redevelopment of St. Thomas was widely critiqued as a botched civic process (Lewis, 2003,
136). Some critics pointed to the housing authority and the city and their corrupt connections to
local developers. Others pointed within to the resident councils and other tenant representatives
who were perceived as having sold out the residents. Ultimately, a displaced St. Bernard resident
told me in an interview, the experience made residents of other developments and their advocates
wary of any future plans for redevelopment (Interview 2, 2007).
When, in early 2005, Pres Kabicoff--a prominent developer involved in the St. Thomas
redevelopment--began discussing the construction of an "Afro-Caribbean Jazz District" atop the
current site of the Iberville public housing development, activists got restless (Interview 3, 2007).
A current white activist prominent in community advocacy coalition leadership described how a
small band of mostly white organizers originating from a radical anti-war group began meeting
in a Catholic community center near the development, trying to notify residents of the threat.
Ultimately, through civil disobedience and direct action the group secured a promise to halt
redevelopment plans from HANO's federal receiver at the time, Carmen Valente (Interview 3,
2007). From this early success emerged what would become the most radical and visible group
involved in the anti-demolition effort after the storm.
The Post-Katrina Public Housing Debate
In the months after Katrina, as the flood waters receded, New Orleanians in hotel rooms and
emergency shelters outside of the city began to take stock and plan for their returns. Public
housing residents, however, were left in limbo as the local housing authority remained quiet
about the future of the city's more than 7,000 public housing units (for information about the
developments, and the decisions eventually made about demolition, see Figure 2.1 on the
following page).
Although some developments had escaped flooding entirely, and others were only minimally
damaged with many immediately habitable units, HANO held off opening or announcing long
term plans for any developments until after Christmas, 2005. After the New Year, the authority
quietly began allowing residents from Fischer to return, as they had with Guste just prior to the
New Year (Filosa, New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 15, 2006). Some low income River
Gardens residents were also allowed to return, although in the intervening months HANO had
leased many of the apartments originally reserved for low-income renters to HANO officials and
emergency first responders so supplies were limited (Filosa, New Orleans Times-Picayune, May
31, 2006).
Public Housing Developments
Name Location Year # ACC Demolition
Opened Units Planned/Completed?
B.W.Cooper Central City 1941 1,545 Yes (pending)
(formerly Calliope)
C.J. Peete Central City 1941 725 Yes (pending)
(formerly Magnolia)
Iberville Treme and Tulane/Gravier 1941 830 No
Lafitte Treme 1941 865 Yes (pending)
River Gardens Irish Channel and 1941 60 Yes (completed in 2001)
(formerly St. Thomas) Lower Garden District
St. Bernard St. Bernard Area 1942 1,400 Yes (pending)
Florida Upper Ninth Ward 1946 400 Yes (in process at time
of storm, now on hold)
Abundance Square Upper Ninth Ward 1956 190 Yes (in process at time
(formerly Desire) of storm, now completed)
Guste Homes Central City 1963 700 No
Fischer Algiers 1965 500 No
Scattered Sites Many Varies 1000 Yes (pending, some units
slated for demolition)
Figure 2.1
With no formal announcement, activists began to speculate about the housing authority's agenda,
particularly regarding the Iberville development which had been eyed by developers for some
time. So on Martin Luther King Day, 2006 activists led a march along the now-abandoned
parade route typically used on the holiday, out from the Lower Ninth Ward, down St. Claude and
Rampart, finishing at the Iberville development. The purpose of the event was to call for
reopening of all pre-Katrina public housing units; Iberville as the march's terminus was thus
symbolically meaningful (Cotton, January 19, 2006).
Although the housing authority continued to be silent about long-term plans, it did begin
allowing families to return to the Iberville, filling 164 units as of March (Sasser, April 11,.2006).
Residents, led by white activists, met the housing authority's silence with a re-occupation
attempt at the St. Bernard development on April 5. Activists failed to occupy the complex; the
rally ended with the arrival of police and the arrest of one resident (Interview 4, 2007).
New Orleans'
In the midst of this brewing conflict, the city was engaging in its first election since the storm.
Both the office of the mayor, as well as several other municipal positions were open. Most of the
elections included incumbent candidates. As a result, politicians struggling to retain their
positions chose to avoid many of the more controversial issues including public housing.
Without any hint from politicians as to the futures of their developments, residents continued to
wonder.
In May, after months of campaigning and a primary that pitted Nagin against 23 other
candidates, he was ultimately reelected in a runoff against Mitch Landrieu, current Lieutenant
Governor, and brother to U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu. Several of Nagin's fellow municipal
politicians were not so lucky; incumbents lost four of seven city council seats. With a fiscally
strapped municipal budget and friction between City Hall and the city council, Nagin embarked
upon a national speaking tour, brushing aside the needs of the city, and especially its most
vulnerable residents (Krupa, New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 6, 2006).
While the mayor generally ignored New Orleans' marginal residents, HUD was actively
planning for their futures. In June, after months of uncertainty, HUD Secretary Alfonso Jackson
held a press conference to announce the plans to demolish and redevelop over 5,000 units. The
units constituted the city's four biggest public housing developments: the Lafitte, the St. Bernard,
B.W. Cooper and C.J. Peete (Filosa, New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 15, 2006).
The decision sparked immediate discussion in a variety of circles around the city and beyond.
Representatives from the Bureau of Government Research, a local think tank and government
watchdog organization, came out in favor of the plan as a tool to deconcentrate race and poverty
by dispersing public housing residents throughout the city and suburbs (Filosa and Maggi, New
Orleans Times-Picayune, October 18, 2006). But articles running in the newspaper in the days
that followed expressed a variety of opinions including strong opposition to the plan (Tidmore,
Louisiana Weekly, July 3, 2006).
Less than two weeks later, on July 27, attorneys for the Advancement Project, a civil rights
organization, filed a federal class action suit on behalf of eighteen public housing residents
against HUD and HANO. The suit alleged that the agencies had violated the fair housing act, the
fifth and the fourteenth amendments (equal protection under law and the right to due process) on
the grounds that the lengthy closure of public housing and the eventual decision to demolish had
had and would continue to have a disproportionate impact on poor black people. Further, they
charged breach of contract with regard to HANO residents' leases. And finally the attorneys
charged that HUD and HANO had violated international laws governing the treatment of
internally displaced peoples by preventing the return of evacuees to their homes prior to
displacement (Quigley, Mitchell and Washington, June 27, 2006).
The attorneys asked that injunctions be filed preventing HUD and HANO from moving forward
with the demolitions, and mandating the reopening and immediate repair of all pre-Katrina units.
Further, the suit called for compensation to make up for damages inflicted on residents as a result
of the discriminatory and illegal treatment on behalf of HANO and HUD.
Nevertheless, the housing authority, under the control of HUD moved swiftly with its plans. On
August 21, 2006 HUD announced Providence Community Housing as the group chosen to
redevelop Lafitte. Providence was a hastily constructed community development arm of Catholic
Charities (HUD, August 21, 2006 and Providence Community Housing, September, 2006). With
the development now in the limelight, and the storm's anniversary approaching, activists
attempted a reoccupation of that development on August 28. HANO police were notified of the
action and five white activists involved in the demonstration, including one coalition member I
interviewed, were arrested (Interview 3).
On August 29 New Orleanians, both those at home, and the nearly three hundred thousand
remaining in evacuation in neighboring cities and states, paused to observe the anniversary of the
storm (Liu, 2006). Politicians waxed poetic and inspirational, promising a rebound. The mayor
and council members reaffirmed a commitment to ease the road home for the city's residents.
On October 3, just over a month after it was announced as the redevelopment agent, Providence
unveiled a preliminary plan for the redevelopment (Filosa, New Orleans Times-Picayune,
October 5 2006). Without exploring the possibility of renovation, HUD required the demolition
of all buildings on the site before it would allow for renovation. Thus the plans showed a
transformed site, the current brick structures replaced by picturesque New Orleans streetscapes
sprouting with nouveau-shotgun shacks.
Despite HANO, HUD and Providence's progress, the court case remained pending. Federal
Judge Ivan Lemelle presided over the opening remarks on October 6. And again, in the midst of
the debate, the city went to the polls, this time for the national mid-term elections.
In the election, Democrats gained control of the senate, and the house was evenly split. Pundits
speculated whether the shift marks a sea change in terms of political sympathy towards the plight
of New Orleans. Housing advocates hoped that--if only to be obstinate--the Democrats would
generate more push back against Republican appointed Alphonso Jackson and his plans for
demolition and privatized redevelopment. Either way, despite the relatively progressive
outcomes of the elections, New Orleanians had to wait almost three months for them to take
effect.
In the meantime, HANO continued to push swiftly towards its goal--perhaps hoping to begin or
even complete demolition before the judge had a chance to issue any sort of legal injunction
against the work. On November 29, 2006 in a procedural nod to participation and historic
preservation requirements, the authority held a public hearing in the auditorium of John
McDonogh Senior High School to formally unveil redevelopment plans and ostensibly elicit
public comment (Filosa, New Orleans Times-Picayune, November 30, 2006). The auditorium
was filled to capacity; residents and other interested parties had traveled from near and far to
attend. Immediately, however, the hearing was derided by housing advocates as a civic farce.
Times-Picayune editorialist Lolis Eric Elie described the process as "dishonest" (Elie, New
Orleans Times-Picayune, December 1, 2006). Public housing reporter Gwen Filosa described the
event as a court mandated opportunity for residents to vent (Filosa, New Orleans Times-
Picayune, November 30, 2006), and Baton Rougue Advocate writer Joe Gyan, Jr. (Baton Rouge
Advocate, November 30, 2006) observed that people in attendance did not buy the housing
authority's promises to find everyone suitable housing, while moving forward with demolition
and redevelopment plans. Following a brief, read statement by a Housing Authority
representative--amid the boos and jeers from hundreds of residents and activists who filled the
packed auditorium--another HANO spokesman came to the podium to take questions. In a
barebones fulfillment of legal and procedural requirements, he allowed attendees to ask
questions, but stated his intention to answer them not at the time but rather via the mail at some
later date.
Meanwhile, both the local and national press were taking an increased interest in the issue. The
Gambit, a local independent weekly published a two part series on Lafitte beginning at the end of
October (Reckdahl, The Gambit, October 24, 2006). And in November Nicolai Ouroussoff, the
New York Times' lead architecture critic printed a lengthy story with half page color pictures on
the cover of the weekly architecture section about the historical significance of the
developments, and specifically about the miscarriage of preservation process that was taking
place (Ouroussoff, New York Times, November 19, 2006).
On December 16,2006, in a controversial move, activists marched on the mayor's house
demanding a reversal of the HUD/HANO decision to demolish. The group of white and black
activists swarmed his front yard, demanding an opportunity to meet with the mayor (Associated
Press, New Orleans Times-Picayune, December 16, 2006). Although the mayor was not present
at the time, he later agreed to attend an anti-demolition gathering later in the week and the
activists disperse. Ultimately, the mayor ended up re-scheduling the meeting to his own office,
and limiting it to residents, barring their attorneys and advocates from attending. As a result, one
white coalition leader I spoke to asserted that the meeting, which took place a few days later,
went widely unnoticed (Interview 3, 2007).
As the year came to a close, another Christmas passed without the vast majority of HANO
residents home. Across the city, less than half of pre-storm residents had returned. And although
un-flooded neighborhoods had returned to pre-storm capacity, large swaths of New Orleans
remained vacant. On December 28,2006, John Edwards announced his bid for the U.S.
Presidency in New Orleans against a backdrop of flooded, vacant homes (Balz, Washington Post,
December 29, 2006).
With the New Year came another Martin Luther King Day action. This time, residents and
activists stormed the St. Bernard public housing development with buckets and brooms. The
housing authority's central claim with regard to demolition was that damaged buildings were too
decrepit to repair. Activists attempted to prove otherwise, by cleaning and gutting lower units in
the development. Additionally, two white activists barricaded themselves into the development's
community center, vowing to stay there until residents were allowed to return (Filosa, New
Orleans Times-Picayune, February 1, 2007).
They remained holed up for the rest of January. During this time, U.S. Representative Maxine
Waters toured the development with the housing authority's head, Donald Babers. Waters, an
experienced politician from California and a renowned advocate for minorities and the poor,
served on the House Banking and Judiciary Committee at the time. Although journalists were not
allowed on the tour, cameramen filming from beyond the property line documented Waters
visibly scolding Babers, and gesturing towards St. Bernard buildings (Survivor's Village HOPE
Video, 2007).
Well after midnight on January 31, two days after Waters' visit, an NOPD SWAT team
assembled at St. Bernard and rushed the barricaded building, forcing the activists out at gunpoint
(Filosa, New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 1, 2007). The activists were evidently not held
by the police for long however. They were shown disrupting a HANO board meeting on
February 1, publicly ridiculing Babers for the evident scolding issued by Waters, before they
were once again hauled away by the police (Survivor's Village HOPE Video, 2007).
On February 8, Ivan Lemelle, the judge hearing the federal case spoke. While he dismissed
plaintiff charges about HUD and HANO violating international laws governing the treatment of
internally displaced peoples, he agreed that they might have a case with regard to violation of
fair housing laws. He then sent the case to a juried trial and set the date for November, 2007
(Filosa, New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 9, 2007).
On March 21 HR 1227, a bill sponsored by Maxine Waters and Barney Frank allocating
additional housing assistance funding to the gulf coast region, passed in a vote of the house. In
addition to general rebuilding funding, the bill called for a redevelopment scheme that created a
one-for-one replacement of existing ACC units, and the immediate reopening of at least 3,000
units.
Despite Waters and Frank's swift movement on the issue, the bill got stuck in the Senate where
Louisiana Senator, Mary Landrieu failed to push the issue forward. One interviewee I spoke with
speculated that Landrieu was somehow beholden to strong influences from the Catholic Church,
a subsidiary of which was awarded one of the redevelopment contracts (Interview 1, 2007).
Another activist from the community advocacy coalition suggested that Landrieu was
maneuvering politically on Capitol Hill (Interview 4, 2007). In any case, after more than two
months, activists called a controversial rally on June 4, 2007 at the Senator's brother, Lt.
Governor Mitch Landrieu's house to try to push her into action (Howells, Indymedia, June 3,
2007). Finally, on June 20, 2007 the senator introduced S. 1668 to the Senate, co-sponsored by
Senator Chris Dodd of Connecticut, a Democrat who was also in the running for his party's
presidential nomination. As of August, 2007 the bill is still awaiting a vote of the Senate.
Meanwhile, back in New Orleans, residents continue to wait for concrete news about their
housing. The field work for this thesis was completed in early July, 2007. As of that date, the
federal injunction against demolition continues to prevent HANO and HUD from tearing down
developments. Nevertheless, the agencies are allowing units to molder without taking any steps
to remediate damage; they are in effect demolishing through inaction. The court case is set to
begin before a Jury in November, 2007.
Conclusion
Since HUD and HANO announced their intention to demolish pubic housing units in New
Orleans, there has been a consistent opposition to their plans. Attorneys, activists and residents
organize rallies, reoccupations and meetings. In what appears to be an unusual effort that cuts
across race and class lines, public housing tenants and architecture critics, powerful attorneys
and hoteliers, advocates of public housing are voicing their opinions and attempting to create a
space where residents are served and where valuable buildings and housing stock are preserved.
In spite of the dire conditions that mobilized opposition, it appeared when I embarked upon this
research that Katrina and the pressure of impending demolition may have not only elicited
opposition, but also elicited a sense of cooperation and collaboration that New Orleans
historically lacked. Thus, the following chapter is a closer analysis of the anti-demolition efforts
and the ways in which it does and does not cut across traditional boundaries of race, class and
power present within New Orleans and beyond.
Chapter Three: Analysis of the Anti-Demolition Effort
The opposition to public housing demolition is made up of three parallel coalitions. They all
work towards the same near term objective of preventing HANO and HUD from tearing down
four public housing developments: Lafitte, St. Bernard, B.W. Cooper and C.J. Peete. But the
coalitions remain distinct from one another due to widely varying longer term objectives,
strategic approaches and ideological bases for their involvement. Furthermore, the coalitions
vary in their attempts to elicit resident support opinions and engagement; although overall
resident participation is low relative to the immense impact this issue will have on the lives of
residents.
A Movement?
When I began researching, I was looking for a single internal logic to the anti-demolition
movement. Immediately, however, I was frustrated in my attempts to locate the single group and
ideology at the crux of the movement. And while individual activists across the movement knew
one another and the actions that each was taking with regard to the issue, there did not appear to
be an overarching group or strategy.
"There is no structure to the opposition to the demolition of public housing," one local journalist
warned me (Interview 5, 2007). Indeed, despite considerable effort I couldn't seem to find the
broad social movement I was looking for. The opposition organized against HUD and HANO's
demolition plans lacked the characteristics of a movement (Fainstein and Hirst, 1994). Rather
than people and organizations engaged in an overarching, transformative campaign, the anti-
demolition effort appeared to be a temporary coming together of a variety of groups and
individuals who situated their opposition in very different ideological and political terms.
Although they were all ostensibly opposing the same thing, this opposition had different
meanings for different players.
The journalist went on to say "there is lots of factionalism among opponents of demolition". And
while her observations seemed to eliminate the movement as a unit for analysis, they laid the
groundwork for analysis at a smaller scale.
Three Coalitions
In another conversation, an attorney offhandedly listed the three parallel coalitions she saw
working on the ground--the preservationists, the attorneys, and the community advocacy groups.
Her descriptions offered me a hint: I was able to identify these sub-coalitions as a new unit of
inquiry.
Internally, these groups indeed fulfilled the characteristics of coalitions. While some members of
each coalition came from larger movements or initiatives, the coalitions themselves constituted
temporary allegiances of individuals and groups. These players agreed to collaborate toward the
accomplishment of a shared goal. In this fashion, the different ways in which individuals situated
their opposition to the demolition were reconciled through the formation of different coalitions.
Drawing from the attorney's characterizations, and from other interviews and collected data, I
identified and named the following coalitions: the community advocacy coalition, the litigation
coalition and the preservation and business coalition. After data collection and organization, I
created a rubric for analyzing each coalition. I looked at why they were involved in the public
housing debate, what their objectives were, how they hoped to achieve these objectives, and
what their underlying missions were, and finally how and from whom each coalition elicited
participation and leadership. After data collection and organization, I was able to concretely
characterize each coalition on the basis of 13 criteria (see table in appendix).
After carefully surveying the coalitions, I attempted to evaluate the significance of race and class
as organizing factors in the formation of these groups. I was initially excited to discover the
absence of race and class as centrally organizing characteristics in any of the group. I took this
absence as evidence that perhaps the coalitions were operating in a fashion that was subversive
to extant race and class hierarchies. After all, all three coalitions exhibit some variety of race and
class within their membership. Even the community advocacy coalition, which has a negative
reputation for consisting solely of white, middle-class activists, claims some poor and some
African American members among its ranks.
Race and class, the central questions of my thesis did not immediately appear to be organizing
factors within the coalitions. As noted above, each coalition had multiracial membership, and
each coalition consistently had some resident participation or attendance at events. The intensity
of this participation will be discussed later, but suffice it to say race and class did not strictly
define the boundaries of the three coalitions.
Given the highly political nature of the public housing debate, I wondered if political affiliation
dictated the coalitional boundaries. Upon examination, I found collaboration with particular
political parties in each coalition, but nevertheless the collaboration is more leveraging an
intersection of interests, rather than an instance of merging of agendas. For example, both the
preservation and business coalition and the litigation coalition have called upon members'
individual relationships with Democratic politicians to raise awareness about the issue. And the
community advocacy coalition has repeatedly looked to socialist and communist political
organizations for support with planning actions and mobilizing attendees. But despite these
inroads, Democratic politicians are not of a single mind when it comes to the issue of public
housing. Democratic New Orleans Councilman Oliver Thomas called public housing residents
soap-opera watchers and advocated facilitating the return of only the best, whereas U.S.
Congressman William Jefferson has consistently argued for the reopening of all pre-Katrina
units. Ultimately, I found that coalitions are definitely not offshoots of existing party politics,
and that they are not even internally politically homogeneous.
Thus, politics and race did not prove to be the centrally organizing characteristics of the
coalitions. Ultimately in terms of understanding them, I returned to the data table and interview
notes. From that initial table, I culled a few vital characteristics that interviewees cited as the
push/pull factors pulling members to particular coalitions, and pushing those coalitions apart
from one another. What emerged were the following three push/pull factors: objectives, tactics
and framework.
The following abridged table (fig. 3.1) summarizes these three push/pull factors: framework,
tactics and objectives (both short and longer term).
Push/Pull Factors by Coalition
Short-Term Objectives
Community Advocacy
Business and Preservation Prevent immediate demolition of Lafitte, St. Bernard, C.J. Peete and B.W. Cooper developments.
Litigation
Mid-Term Objectives
Community Advocacy Complete basic repairs and reopen 7,000 units to all pre-Katrina tenants.
Business Complete basic repairs on easily rehabilitated units and reopen them to those pre-Katrina tenants who
want to come back.
Preservation Ensure proper historic property protocol is followed by HUD, HANO and any prospective developers
of the sites.
Litigation Prove damages incurred by tenants as a result of unlawfully terminated leases (unequal protection
under law). Ensure interim housing for tenants, and a requirement for resident participation in any
plan to redevelop complexes.
Long-Term Objectives
Community Advocacy Complete basic repairs and reopen 7,000 units to all pre-Katrina tenants.
Business Stimulate economic growth by addition of public housing tenants as labor for visitor industry.
Conduct participatory planning process to determine the future of the developments. Make reduction
of density, concentration of poverty, and tenure of household stay in developments a foundation of
any redevelopment plan.
Preservation Protect New Orleans' historic architecture by monitoring adherence to existing regulations and
precedent.
Litigation Protect civil rights by fighting for equal protection under the law, especially for poor and otherwise
marginalized populations (including New Orleans public housing residents).
Framework
Community Advocacy Anti-war, anti-capitalist, class-based global solidarity.
Business Economic and physical rejuvenation of the city.
Preservation Preservation of the city's historic architecture and neighborhoods, proper adherence to codes
regulating development of historic buildings and properties.
Litigation Law, civil rights.
Figure 3.1
Tactics
Community Advocacy Rallying radical activists from other locations, and utilizing visiting volunteer labor from progressive
local relief organizations. Civil disobedience including rallies, marches on officials' homes and
offices, unlawful occupation of developments, denouncing of adversaries. Maximizing press
coverage of events.
Business and Preservation Playing upon members' personal and professional connections to convey concerns to decision
makers, to get particular perspectives covered in the media, and to attain insider political information
in time to be proactive. Minimizing direct press coverage of coalition activities to preserve low
profile of membership because of the controversial nature of public housing.
Litigation Rallying local and national civil rights advocates. Tapping into coalition members' social and
professional networks to attain insider political and judicial information, as well as information about
HUD and HANO's defense strategies in time to be proactive. Ensuring a consistent and credible
voice when offering information to the press.
Figure 3.1, contd.
Push/Pull Factors
Objectives refer to the goals of a particular coalition. In most cases, interviewees distinguished
between near and longer term objectives. While all three coalitions point to preventing
demolition as an immediate goal, their objectives diverge sharply from that point. Mid-term
goals vary dramatically, as the question of what to do with the existing buildings and currently
displaced resident population arises.
Longer-term goals often dovetail with the overarching frameworks guiding each coalition's
involvement. These frameworks reveal the ideology and larger mission of each coalition's work.
They function as both push and pull factors, attracting potential members to one coalition, while
repelling them from others. They are, in some cases, attached to a particular political philosophy
or ideology.
Finally, tactics are the decisions each coalition makes in the context of its framework in order to
attain its objectives. Tactics speak to what a given coalition's membership believes will best
accomplish the group's long, mid and short term goals. While interviewees rarely cited tactics
alone as a pull factor, positively influencing their decision to join a particular coalition, tactics
were often cited as a push factor as individuals pointed to coalitions' strategies that they were not
comfortable with.
Objectives, frameworks and tactics were the common criteria by which interviewees identified
themselves with particular coalitions, and differentiated themselves from others. As such, they
represent the three most salient push/pull factors that demarcate internal cohesion and external
boundaries for the three anti-demolition coalitions.
What I found, with regard to these three factors was that while they did not organize themselves
around race or class divisions, they did generate concentrations of particular race or class groups
across the movement. For example, for residents--whose housing and their ability to continue
residing in the city at all were at stake on the one hand, but who had much less abundant
resources and time than other groups on the other hand--the decision of where (or whether) to
place one's self in the movement was dependent upon different things than civil rights attorneys
or middle class white activists.
What follows is an in depth description of each coalition via these criteria. Below is an abridged
table that roughly outlines the following sections.
The Community Advocacy Coalition
The community advocacy coalition is frequently featured in local news stories, and functions as
a very public face for the anti-demolition movement. High profile rallies and re-occupations
make the coalition appealing to journalists. The coalition's claim as a mouthpiece for residents
brings them both credibility and criticism.
The community advocacy coalition is responsible for most of the direct action associated with
the anti-demolition movement. It planned the rally and march on Martin Luther King Day, 2006
and orchestrated the reoccupation of St. Bernard to mark the holiday the following year. The
coalition was also responsible for planning the marches on both Mayor Nagin's home and the
home of Lt. Governor Mitch Landrieu to urge his sister, Senator Mary Landrieu to push public
housing issues in the U.S. Senate.
In terms of membership, the community advocacy coalition is made up of a regular cast of
mostly white, middle-class advocates, and a somewhat less regular group of residents (mostly
poor and African American.) In addition, an ever rotating collection of young white progressives,
visiting as volunteers for rebuilding and organizing outfits, are loaned to the coalition to populate
actions.
The community advocacy coalition consists of a handful of different intersecting groups that
each stake their claims on different developments, but that share common approaches to the
larger issue. With the exception of one of these groups, leadership is dominated by middle-class
non residents. In the one resident-led group, white, non-residents continue to play a significant
role in advising and guiding group activities.
Overall, the community advocacy group has offered the direct action counterpoint to the
litigation coalition's formal lawsuit. Frequently featured in the press, the community advocacy
coalition comprises a large part of the public face for the anti-demolition movement. But while
this coverage has sometimes lent credibility to the movement, it also opens the coalition to public
critique.
Criticism is leveled for a variety of reasons. Skeptics think the coalition is opportunistic for
folding the public housing issue into its larger political agenda; one informant quoted the city
council president calling the coalition "poverty pimps". This larger agenda is itself also grounds
for criticism. "Class struggle is the theme. They think class warfare will solve it all," a member
of the preservation and business coalition said of the community advocates, "but they're not
really effective policy advocates because of it" (Interview 1, 2007). Other criticism revolves
around the coalition being "proprietary" (Interview 5, 2007) and "really caring about the media"
(Interview 6, 2007). And in a very personal critique that cuts right to the heart of legitimacy and
representation, one journalist scoffed "I'll bet you not one of those people has ever lived, or ever
had a relative who lived in public housing" (Interview 5, 2006).
It is interesting to compare the critiques of the community advocacy coalition with those of the
litigation coalition. The two groups are similarly high profile, each staging its own public
actions. But the litigation coalition suffers many fewer attacks on credibility and its right to
represent (in the most literal sense, as attorneys) the perspectives of residents. Obviously the
nature of representation in each of the coalitions differs. But also, the litigation coalition is
dominated by local leadership. Although the head lawyers are not all African American, and
none of them are from particularly poor backgrounds, they are perceived as locals--trusted
insiders who understand the plight of fellow New Orleanians. This is not true in the case of
leadership in the community advocacy coalition.
Objectives
The community advocacy coalition's framework is defined by a belief in class-based solidarity.
"We always framed it (the public housing issue) as a class issue," a coalition member told me.
"Even though all the residents are African American working class, if they destroy public
housing, going after this poor African American community, it's going to affect all working class
struggles that rely on public services" (Interview 3, 2007).
Beyond blocking immediate demolition, their objectives look ahead to a "call for a massive
public works program, union jobs, union wages and democratic control". With regard to public
housing, they admit that their "focus isn't so much on this case as on the movement" (Interview
3, 2007). However, they see re-habitation of the complexes by their pre-Katrina occupants, as
well as re-opening the city's public health facilities and improvements of other public institutions
as a mid-term step towards a broad based expansion of public goods and services.
Eventually the community advocacy coalition hopes to push for a re-opening of all 14,000 pre-
1990 units as traditional ACC rentals, as part of a permanently protected socialization of goods
and services. And in the long term, the community advocacy coalition hopes to see a global
class-based solidarity movement with the power to overthrow capitalism and its attending
exploitative institutions. They see the public housing struggle as a small step towards this larger
goal: one activist admitted that he hoped "St. Bernard will be our Stalingrad" (Interview 3,
2007).
Framework
The community advocacy coalition's objectives are deeply rooted in a Marxist assumption of the
moral bankruptcy of capitalism. More than with their fellow anti-demolition coalitions, the
community advocacy coalition positions itself in the context of a global solidarity movement. In
interviews with coalition members, they sited collaboration with immigrants' rights activists in
Los Angeles, the Revolutionary Communist Party in Houston, the World Social Forum in Davos,
Switzerland and the U.S. Social Forum in Atlanta. These collaborations, on a national and global
scale, take the place of the coalition's rocky attempts to collaborate with local allies. By their
own accounts, and the accounts of other coalitions, the community advocacy coalition members
"don't work well with others all the time" (Interview 3, and also echoed in Interview 1, Interview
4, Interview 5, Interview 6, 2007).
At the crux of the community advocacy coalition lays a union of two distinct movements: the
anti-war group and the public housing advocacy movement. The coalition members emphasize
the relationships between what they refer to as the "war abroad and the war at home" (Interview
3, 2007). They seek, through the lens of this public housing struggle, to draw direct links
between U.S. foreign policies that serve to spread exploitation and warfare abroad, and U.S.
domestic policies that reinforce racism, poverty and urban neglect.
These connections have bred alliances throughout the anti-war movement and the radical left.
The local movement has formed alliances with national figures such as Cindy Sheehan, the anti-
war activist who has appeared at several anti-demolition events. Figures like this help to enliven
the connections the coalition attempts to draw.
Despite its legitimacy among politically similar organizations elsewhere, the community
advocacy coalition struggles to maintain a sense of credibility locally. Even with a somewhat
racially and economically diverse membership, the coalition's mostly white middle-class
leadership opens the group to attacks from both within and outside of the larger anti-demolition
movement.
A variety of the people I spoke with derided the group, or generally discredited its perspectives
and approaches. One journalist described them as a bunch of "white, reactionary hippies"
(Interview 5, 2007). And a member of the community advocacy coalition himself described
being dismissed as a "bunch of white guys who try to represent the poor black residents of public
housing" (Interview 3, 2007).
While a leader in the coalition described their effort as an attempt "to breakdown the divisions
between the public housing community and the community outside" (Interview 3, 2007), a
business and preservation coalition member and longtime follower of local political struggles
explained to me, "they had varying degrees of tenant support, and they interposed themselves as
the spokesperson, the representative of the tenants. And to some extent it prevented the tenants'
voices from not only being heard, but for them really to develop and advance the public
discourse on their own" (Interview 1, 2007). Another interviewee, a journalist knowledgeable
about the issue, put it more succinctly: "The activists seem disingenuous; they take advantage of
residents in a desperate and vulnerable situation, and put them in harm's way. They get them
arrested. They tell them civil disobedience and knocking down fences is the best way to get
home" (Interview 5, 2007).
Although these critiques point explicitly to race and class, they allude to another underlying
reason for the coalition's marginality and lack of credibility: the relative outsider status of its
leadership. Unlike the leaders in other coalitions who come from longstanding New Orleans
families and hold powerful business and political positions, the community advocacy leaders
have only the short histories of their own relationships in the city to rely upon. In a city built on
generations of quid pro quo indebtedness, this leaves the community advocacy coalition at a
distinct disadvantage in terms of legitimacy and relationship building.
Tactics
Nevertheless, the journalist's assessment cuts to the heart of the coalition's questioned
legitimacy, and also touches upon its preferred tactics. The coalition relies primarily upon direct
action to promote its perspectives. "This is where public housing residents have strength,"
asserted one white activist central in coalition leadership, "through disruption, through mass
action. When they get sucked in to negotiations, they lose their source of power. And so that's
where the movement focused on" (Interview 3, 2007).
The coalition's tactical bread and butter consists of rallies, forcible re-occupation of shuttered
units, marches on the offices and homes of local political figures, and denouncements. It remains
to be seen how effective this approach is, but regardless it functions to repel many would be
allies who find the coalition strategically untenable. For the community advocacy coalition, one
activist from another coalition complained, "there's no room for compromise...Frankly," he
went on, "their tactics, in a lot of ways, are outmoded and rigid" (Interview 1, 2007).
Ultimately the combination of tactics, framework and objectives prevent the community
advocacy coalition from effectively allying with many potential supporters locally. But at the
same time, these positions give the group a unique capacity to take advantage of national and
even global networks. Perhaps more than any other coalition, the community advocacy coalition
has been able to channel relationships with far flung political, social and volunteer organizations
into critical support and action at the local level.
Similarly, the coalition has space to disregard criticisms of tactics and longer-term objectives, as
the particulars of this political battle and the relationships it entails are secondary to the larger
political and social revolution the group is working towards. Ultimately, the outcome of this
particular battle may be less important to the coalition than the extent to which it builds upon the
larger movement it promotes.
The Preservation and Business Coalition
The preservation and business coalition operates as a quiet counterpoint to the community
advocacy coalition. A collaboration between business, political and preservation interests, the
coalition is able to forge unusual partnerships by ensuring members discretion and the ability to
participate without drawing public attention or criticism.
After Jackson's demolition announcement, the conveners of the coalition--mostly political and
business figures--realized that they "needed to do something substantive, needed to build some
constituencies to support public and affordable housing" (Interview 1, 2007). Specifically, the
conveners were interested in workforce housing that creates affordable shelter for a low-wage
low-skill labor force. Towards this end, a small cadre of business and political colleagues set
about bringing together an unusual coalition.
Today, the preservation and business coalition consists of a variety of preservationists,
politicians and business interests. More than any other coalition, this group is dominated by the
city's elite: prominent land and business owners, lobbyists, public intellectuals and members of
some of the city's most powerful political families.
My simplistic first impressions of the city made me expect this coalition of influential New
Orleanians to also be a coalition of white New Orleanians. In a city heavy with the history of
slavery and Jim Crow laws, I didn't initially anticipate a significant black business community.
However, the preservation and business coalition is quite ethnically diverse; the meetings I
attended were typically at least half African American. The coalition provides a good reminder
that race and class do not neatly overlap in New Orleans and that African American is not
effective shorthand for poor and disempowered. Rather, the city has a strong black middle class
and is currently politically controlled by a cadre of wealthy and powerful black New Orleanians.
The concentration of power within certain circles in the black community does not dilute the
history of racial oppression and the sense of race-based solidarity. The presence of black
membership lends the coalition credibility in its involvement in what is seen as a black issue.
Without black members, white preservationists and businessmen would be regarded with intense
suspicion as we see with the community advocacy coalition.
But while HANO's pre-storm resident population was indeed 100% African American (Quigley,
Mitchell and Washington, 2006, 36), black members of the coalition do not necessarily share
many of the life experiences of residents. For the most part, members occupy politically and
economically powerful positions in the city. Rather than functioning as a communal reminder of
the failings of equity in our society, coalition members are living testaments to how far we've
come with regard to equal opportunities and civil rights. And so it is not necessarily a sense of
empathy, but less sentimental interests that bring coalition members together: the economic or
civic benefits offered by HANO residents, and the aesthetic and historic value of the buildings
they occupied.
Framework
In the beginning, the conveners of the preservation and business coalition cast their struggle and
involvement into a framework of general urban uplift. As economically or politically interested
parties, they saw obvious benefits to improvements in the social and business life of the city.
Some, hailing from long local political dynasties, or progressive or charitable backgrounds,
further couched the overarching mission and motivations in terms of civic responsibility to poor
and marginalized populations.
Through a methodical examination of interests, they realized that "public housing was essential
to the recovery of the visitor industry. And either by default or decision, the visitor industry was
an essential element to the recovery" in general (Interview 1, 2007).
Beyond simply providing a source of cheap labor, public housing residents also offer an aura of
New Orleans authenticity. A coalition member told me about a hotelier who declined the
opportunity to hire cheap foreign laborers, saying "that was not the experience he was selling. He
wanted his chamber maids to be familiar with the city, to say 'good mornin' darlin" to his
guests. He wanted his doorman, if a guest asked him 'where can I go to hear some authentic
music, or where's that--what do they call it--that second line thing on Sunday', that he would
know or know somebody who knows". The coalition member summed it up by saying, "the very
authenticity of the experience that the visitor industry was selling--not just to leisure travelers but
to conventioneers and people coming for business purposes--that is really at stake" (Interview 3,
2007). Thus, the hotelier was engaged in a type of cultural preservation.
After raising awareness about the connection between public housing and local economic
recovery, and attracting a number of local businessmen and women, the conveners turned to
preservationists. "When we found out that HUD had not complied with Section 106 of the
Historic Preservation Act, we were able really to excite the people who care about historic
preservation," explained one of the organizers (Interview 3, 2007).
Preservationists generally operate under a framework of cultural and historic conservation; In
New Orleans, they are seen as allies of the wealthy and purveyors of gentrification in New
Orleans. But the conveners were able to make the argument that "if Section 106 doesn't protect
the Lafitte development, which is National Historic Register eligible, or Cooper which is on the
National Register, then how can it protect the St. Louis Cathedral or the Cabildo art Gallery?"
(Interview 3, 2007).
So, to everyone's surprise, including the often skeptical members of the community advocacy
coalition, the preservationists came on board. "I mean they're not going to come out and protest
or do much, but they did come out," (Interview 4, 2007) one community advocate observed.
Objectives
With the short term objective clear--to block plans for demolition and ensure proper historic
procedures--the divergent interests have been able, for the time being, to collaborate. It will be
interesting, however, to watch the coalition unfold over a more extended period of time.
The business and political interests see public housing as a critical piece in a longer term
objective of city-wide rejuvenation. In the mid-term they look forward to repopulation of the
developments and a collaborative planning process including public housing residents,
professional planners and prominent local figures, with the intention of devising a realistic and
agreeable redevelopment plan for the complexes. Features they hope for include a decrease in
density and an increase in income mixing, built in resident tenure limits, comprehensive job
training programs an the support necessary to move ACC renters from subsidized to
unsubsidized housing, and perhaps eventually to homeownership.
Preservationists, on the other hand, locate their objectives in the general preservation of historic
building stock in the city. It is unclear how or whether this agenda will continue to intersect with
the needs of public housing residents and communities or the agenda of urban rejuvenation
espoused by other coalition members. While I was in New Orleans conducting interviews, for
example, rumors circulated that the preservationists had come to an agreement with HUD and
HANO about the historic protocol to be followed, and that they would shortly be leaving the
anti-demolition movement. Preservationists cut such a deal during the St. Thomas redevelopment
conflict, stopping their opposition as soon as the housing authority agreed to retain a few of the
original buildings. As of August, 2007 the rumors have not amounted in any concrete actions on
the part of preservationists, but they do serve to illustrate cognizance, within the anti-demolition
movement, of the tenuous nature of the preservationists' collaboration.
Tactics
Regardless of future goal-defining debates, the preservationists continue to collaborate with
business and political interests, employing tactics that rely primarily on low-profile quid pro quo
dealing in a city that runs on personal relationships, favors and patronage. Perhaps the coalition's
greatest strength lies not in the interests it represents, but in the individuals it counts among its
members. Personal relationships have allowed this coalition to attract federal level political
attention and news coverage from the most influential media outlets in the country. The
preservation and business coalition prompted articles in both the Gambit and the New York
Times against demolition.
While their tactics are patently non-confrontational and largely behind the scenes, as the
community advocate above reluctantly observed, at the end of the day both preservationists and
the business and political elite of this coalition still "did come out" for the struggle. But unlike
the community advocacy tactics which are marked by mistrust of power, the preservation and
business coalition works within the extant political and power structure, seeking to avoid
jeopardizing extant and potential future relationships.
Predictably, this approach is not universally appreciated. As one community advocate put it, the
preservation and business coalition's "pandering" to local elites, and their reduction of public
housing residents to labor and consumer units was "ugly" (Interview 4, 2007). But operating
largely behind the scenes and thus out of the path of public criticism, the preservation and
business coalition is managing to raise awareness, and doing so in a language that attempts to
appeal to constituents not typically interested in the fate of public housing or its residents.
The Litigation Coalition
The litigation coalition consists of attorneys and staff from three civil rights legal aid
organizations. Two of these organizations, NAACP Legal Aid and the Advancement Project
operate at the national level. The third, the Loyola Law Clinic is a local organization with a long
history of defending low-income and marginalized clients, and fighting prominent court battles
about civil rights and equality.
Although two of the organizations are not head quartered locally, the third locally-trusted
organization has become the public face of the coalition and the lawsuit they are using to address
the demolition threat. This image of being local has done a lot to generate credibility for the
coalition and its members. The coalition is thought to be made up of insiders who authentically
care fore and understand the city. This offers a good counterpoint to the community advocacy
coalition which is disregarded on the grounds of being dominated by outsiders.
The insider image the coalition promotes is embodied by three key attorneys on the case. Two
local African American attorneys--Ishmael Muhammad and Tracie Washington--hail from
prominent New Orleans families, and Muhammad is the son of a famous and respected civil
rights and Black Nationalist leader. The third attorney, Bill Quigley is a white law professor
originally hailing from elsewhere, has run the Loyola Clinic and provided free legal support for
the better part of two decades. As such, he has proven himself many times over through is
service to poor, mostly black New Orleanians.
Apart from these attorneys, the litigation team consists of other attorneys within each
organization, and a largely invisible army of support staff, expert witnesses, law students
working pro-bono, and the tiny handful of residents represented in the class action suit. In sum,
the litigation team does not exhibit the kind of racial makeup that would appear essential for
establishing credibility. However, African American faces dominate the case's press and public
appearances. The leadership possesses credibility associated with its insider status. And the
official capacity with which attorneys represent their clients further exempts the litigation
coalition from the kind of scrutiny and legitimacy questions directed towards coalitions with less
formalistic relationships to resident members.
Apart from its watertight claim of local legitimacy, the litigation coalition does face occasional
criticism from members of the anti-demolition movement who feel left out of the legal goings
on. "The lawyers with the lawsuit: they have particular people they deal with, and we're kind of
left out of the loop and that's problematic," complained one community advocacy coalition
member (Interview 3, 2007). Indeed, this sentiment might be particularly true for the community
advocacy coalition members who are excluded in a more general sense in a town as small and
provincial as New Orleans. Longstanding relationships criss-cross between the litigation
coalition and the preservation and business coalitions. Both groups are peopled by prominent
New Orleanians who've worked together on this or that for years. This casual intimacy is not a
reality however for most of the members of the community advocacy coalition.
The only other criticism of the litigation coalition I encountered is in the context of general
critiques of the judicial system. In a city reputed to be rife with corruption, regardless of the good
work of the litigation coalition some critics view the decisive judicial bodies as hopelessly
crooked. "The courts," remarked the same community advocate from above, "they're nothing but
politicians in robes." Ultimately, however, he followed this remark with the admission that "the
case itself does have an impact on what they (HUD and HANO) can do" (Interview 3, 2007).
Tactics
The tactics used to achieve this impact revolve around the judicial system. The parties involved
in the litigation coalition anticipate that precedent set in the class action suit against HANO and
HUD will affect the future of all four contested complexes and the tens of thousands of residents
who called them home.
These judicial-based tactics create clear roles and relationships for participating parties. Amid
the constellation of judges, attorneys, clients and clerks, we find a transparent hierarchy, and in
the context of the laws, the courts and the setting of precedent, we see the coalition's scope of
intended impact transparently arrayed.
As mentioned earlier, the nature of these prescribed relationships gets the litigation team
somewhat off the hook in terms of proving its legitimacy through its membership. Furthermore,
this protocol officially designates particular people to convey the coalition's message to the
public. Without the need for lengthy democratic process or a representative face, information
decisions and agendas can be delivered in a unilateral voice at press conferences, in the
courtroom, or through the cool sterility of legal briefs.
The employment and effect of political and social connections in the litigation coalition is the
other component of the coalition's tactics. As noted earlier, the effective presentation of a
handful of connected, familiar and respected attorneys offers this case an air of legitimacy it
would not otherwise enjoy. In addition, there is no way to estimate the impact that these
prominent figures' complex local networks of relationships might have on the coalition's ability
to affect outcomes, cut deals and manipulate public, political and judicial opinion. Without
implying in any way that the litigation coalition is unfairly exercising connections or cashing in
on untoward favors, this does bring to light the community advocate's earlier description of
judges as politicians.
Objectives
As one prosecuting attorney quipped, "I don't represent buildings, I represent people" (Interview
6, 2007). Indeed, the litigation coalition's immediate objective, with regard to the buildings
slated for demolition, is that residents who were living there have contractual rights to both have
their leases honored, and to participate in any larger discussions around redevelopment.
According to the same attorney, the case revolves centrally around whether the units are
habitable and whether the plaintiffs have been damaged. My data cannot confirm a particular set
of mid-range objectives, but rather the coalition is most interested in ensuring a favorable
agreement between the housing authority and its residents, and the legal guarantee of a
participatory planning process for any future redevelopment activities. This ties into the litigation
coalition's long range objectives around ensuring the protection of civil rights.
Framework
The guiding framework is more descriptive than objectives; broadly, the coalition is guided by
the law, but more specifically it is working towards assurance and protection of civil rights. All
three legal aid organizations involved in the case list civil rights as part of their mission, and
evidently chose to become involved in the public housing case because they suspected a civil
rights violation.
Katrina has widely been hailed as the rebirth of the civil rights movement. The aftermath of the
storm and the government's botched attempts to remedy the situation were broadcast live around
the globe. And as pundits and observers will remark for years to come, the images of New
Orleans poverty and neglect remind our nation of how far civil rights and equal opportunities
have yet to go.
The three organizations and their attorneys come from a variety of civil rights related
backgrounds ranging from faith based social justice movements, to black nationalists. These
mingling ideological backgrounds, colliding with the urgency of the issue to HANO residents
and the city as a whole, the case's deep racial and class implications, and a possible
receptiveness on the part of politicians and the public as a result of widespread media coverage
in New Orleans, combine to produce this hopefully precedent setting case. It is easy to view this
case through the lens of civil rights.
Coalitions, Participation and the Future
Overall this chapter evaluates the current characteristics and operations of each coalition.
Another dimension to this issue, however, is time. As touched upon in the sections above, each
coalition has defined objectives that extend beyond the immediate term, and diverge from one
another after that point. Insofar as this thesis constitutes an evaluation of the incorporation of
diverse voices into the anti-demolition effort, it is critical to examine the possible implications of
each coalition's longer range objectives on the movement's overall level of diverse engagement
and leadership building.
Of the various groups, only the preservationists leave public housing residents and developments
entirely out of their mid and long term goals, focusing instead on broader issues of historic
preservation. They see their stake in public housing ending with a successful application of the
legal protocols around preservation; the preservationists do not express interest in the
empowerment or long term welfare of public housing communities. The rest of the anti-
demolition movement includes residents, complexes or both in future plans.
The community advocacy faction's mid-term objectives are to push HUD and HANO to
complete basic repairs and open all 7,000 pre-Katrina units to their former residents as soon as
possible. In the long-term they hope for an expansion of the public housing stock to its pre-1990
level of 14,000 units. They believe in the fundamental institution of public housing, and fight
against any redevelopment schemes that force mixing of incomes, scattering of residents into
surrounding communities, or the introduction of programs within developments to promote
market rate renting or home ownership among residents. In addition, their-long term objectives
include the construction of a class-based solidarity movement that will eventually rise up against
capitalism.
While the community advocacy faction's overarching anti-capitalist vision would evidently
include public housing residents, empowerment of residents themselves does not otherwise
figure in the group's long-term objectives. While mid-term objectives would bring residents
home, the long-term vision precludes any participatory discussion as to the fate of public housing
in favor of a prescriptive plan that increases the number of traditional public housing units to the
exclusion of non-public housing options for residents.
In response to accusations that they're unresponsive to what actual residents want and need, they
argue that public housing as a public good is as much non-residents' business as it is the business
of the residents. Contrary to residents' arguments for transitional programs to support market-
rate renting and homeownership, coalition members argue that in advocating for an increase in
strictly ACC units they are advocating for the thousands of New Orleanians on the HANO
waiting list and for future HANO residents who deserve access to the public good as much as
current residents do.
This response ostensibly represents the will of poor, marginalized people in the city. However, it
is clear that the coalition has not in fact consulted with a majority of the city's marginalized poor,
nor do they offer visible support for these people in articulating their own perspectives on
housing opportunities for low-income renters. Rather, the objective is ascribed to the poor but
chosen by the rhetoric of the coalition's larger ideological framework.
The business interests involved in the anti-demolition movement define their mid-term
objectives similarly to the community advocacy coalition: they want HUD and HANO to
complete basic repairs and reopen units to those pre-Katrina residents who express a desire to
come back. In the long term, the business interests hope to stimulate local economic growth by
the addition of public housing tenants as labor for the visitor industry. Mostly, the business
interests conceptualize public housing residents as economic units with labor and consumption
potential; its unclear if the business community's willingness to welcome residents back will
hinge on individuals' capacity to contribute to the economy. But in any case, with regard to the
developments, the collation says it intends to conduct a participatory planning process including
business, neighborhood and resident representatives to determine the future of the developments.
Ideally, they'd like to see a long-range plan which retains some of the buildings but which
deconcentrates poverty, builds in a limit on the years one can reside in public housing, and builds
supportive services such as job training to help residents transition into market rate renting.
The coalition's mid-term objective supports residents with a choice to return. Interestingly,
resident return is part of a longer-term economic development strategy which utilizes public
housing residents as low-wage labor to stimulate the visitor industry. The tourism industry in
New Orleans is one which relies upon low-wage, low-skill employees, so it would seem that
ultimately this sector would not want to promote such drastic social and economic change as to
raise prevailing wages or educational levels. However, unexpectedly the second part of the
business interests' long-term objectives does just that. More than any other coalition, this group
hopes to inject long-range change into public housing communities. It calls for a participatory
planning process that includes resident representatives. As noted in the resident chapter, the
process of electing resident representatives can be fraught with power plays; nevertheless, the
explicit inclusion of resident stakeholders offers the distinct potential for authentic resident input
in the process. Additionally it calls for job training and money management classes that have the
potential to opportunities beyond tourism work for residents. Perhaps less surprisingly, the
business interests' call for a redevelopment scheme that does focus on income mixing and ,
ambitiously, increased market rate renting and home ownership among residents, all things that
are likely to raise property values and visitors' and locals' perception of safety in the city.
In the mid-term, the litigation faction will try to win compensation from HUD and HANO for
damages inflicted upon residents. This step will end the client/attorney relationship between
residents and the coalition. From there, the members of the coalition will continue, through work
on other cases, to ensure that civil rights are upheld by holding defendants accountable when
plaintiffs' have been denied due process, equal protection under the law, or other civil rights
guaranteed by federal law.
Obviously, class action compensation for residents could help many residents gain access to
opportunities and goals otherwise unreachable. But other than that, the lawsuit brought by the
litigation faction does little to fundamentally empower residents or poor black New Orleanians in
general. In many situations, including the anti-demolition effort, discrimination and the denial of
opportunities for leadership and voice happen on much more of an implicit than an explicit,
regulated level. Without fundamental changes in the way that people think and relate, civil rights
law can only go so far in realigning race and class relations and closing opportunity and outcome
disparities across society.
Thus, the three coalitions and four groups that emerge (on account of the split between business
and preservation factions after the demolition question is settled) support or subvert
empowerment of traditionally marginalized groups in different ways. Overall, there is no single
position participants in the anti-demolition effort takes with regard to closing race and class
disparities in New Orleans. Rather, in general the coalition focuses its attack on one of the
symptoms (the threatened demolition of 5,000 poor black families' homes) of these disparities,
rather than the root causes.
This focus draws immediate movement attention away from empowerment in favor of urgent
action. Evaluation at a later point would help show whether the movement ultimately makes
room for engagement of resident voices and leadership. In the meantime, analysis of the longer
range objectives of each coalition within the movement begins to describe what some of these
outcomes might look like.
Conclusion
In my search for an anti-demolition movement, I instead identified a disparate effort comprised
of three distinct coalitions each working in parallel. Observation, media accounts and interviews
all testified to the separations between these coalitions, but it was not initially clear what
internally organized them, or distinguished them from one another.
In attempting to understand what created internal cohesion and separation of one coalition from
the others, I identified three push/pull factors. A combination of objectives, tactics and
framework serve to characterize each coalition, and to differentiate it from the others. By
understanding each distinct coalition in the context of these push/pull factors, I came to better
understand the ways that the coalitions address one another and address the larger challenge of
preventing demolition of public housing and charting a future path for the complexes and their
communities.
Furthermore, this analysis examined some of the ways that these coalitions at times subvert
extant social, racial and economic hierarchies, and more often take advantage of these existing
structures to define their agendas and organize their decision making and actions. While this
chapter revealed much about what is present in the movement, it also reveals a gaping absence.
Although there is occasional resident membership in each group, residents are largely lacking
from the debate. The following chapter builds upon the coalitions and push/pull factors identified
here, to delve into the reasons for resident involvement and lack of involvement, and the many
factors that residents must juggle in advocating for themselves and their communities in post-
Katrina New Orleans.
Chapter Four: Resident Roles
In the last chapter I described an organizing terrain marked by three different coalitions, each
with some resident participation but typically with limited resident leadership. In attempting to
evaluate whether this coalition building marks a shift in the race and class based hierarchies that
have organized political and social engagement in the past in New Orleans, the absence of
resident leadership is significant. But to truly understand what this fact tells us about the
coalitions and their successes and or failures at breaking thorough race and class boundaries, we
must further analyze the reasons for the overall absence, but intermittent presence of residents in
the movement.
In accounts of public housing struggles from other cities, we often see a strong resident voice. In
Vale's descriptions of public housing rehabilitation efforts (Vale, 2002), he cites tenant
newspapers, resident committees, associations and task forces engaged in advocacy for Boston
developments. Sudhir Venkatesh's chronicle of the descent of the Robert Taylor Homes
(Venkatesh, 2002) dedicates chapters to tenant engagement. And Roberta M. Feldman and Susan
Stahl's (Feldman and Stahl, 2004) look at Chicago's Wentworth Gardens focuses on women-
centered activism in the public housing development.
Given this apparent pattern, the absence of a coalition of residents from New Orleans' threatened
developments is a bit surprising. Like Vale's West Broadway development (Vale, 2002), HANO
residents share a striking demographic homogeneity: the authority's resident population was
100% African American prior to the storm (Quigley, Mitchell and Washington, 2006, 36). New
Orleans' public housing developments suffered much of the same neglect, and crime that
galvanized Robert Taylor Homes residents. And much of the same household and community
structure Feldman and Stahl point to as an origin for political mobilization among women tenants
is also present in New Orleans. With the evident ingredients present, one would expect to find
visible tenant organizing.
Of course different places face different challenges. Both HANO residents and New Orleanians
in general confront a variety of common and unique obstacles to organizing. The broad
devastation of public housing, the city and peoples' lives, wrought by Katrina, has created
several specific conditions that make organizing difficult. Additionally, historic, social and
cultural forces pre-dating Katrina continue to act as barriers to effective mobilization.
But while there is no single unified resident movement, there is some scattered tenant activism
around the planned demolitions. Tenants do not constitute an independent coalition or a singular
voice. But, as touched upon in earlier chapters, a small handful of residents are active in each of
the three coalitions comprising the anti-demolition movement.
Observing the limited presence of some residents folded into larger coalitions, and the absence of
others, raises some questions. Namely, why have resident activists chosen to participate in extant
coalitions instead of unifying into a single separate coalition? Why have other residents chosen
not to participate at all?
Why Do Some Residents Participate in Existing Coalitions?
The most obvious reason HANO residents have not joined together in a unified coalition is that
they do not share a unified sense of objectives, framework or tactics. Planners often run the risk
of assuming uniformity of opinion based upon shared demographics, when in fact there is none.
"You can't reify residents. There are political divisions," asserted a community advocacy
coalition member (Interview 4, 2007). Although residents would appear to share common
interests, the way that they view and prioritize these interests, and the strategies they adopt to
achieve these interests vary widely.
"Residents are split," concluded a local journalist, and furthermore "they'll go one way then
they'll hop back over the fence" (Interview 5, 2007). Indeed, of the residents I met with, some
wanted all the units re-opened as public housing, while others hoped that residents would be
brought back in the short-term but that the sites would ultimately undergo a comprehensive re-
development. Some residents were eager to march on the homes and offices of elected officials
while others "are home with their families and don't want to come out", as one resident
explained at a July community advocacy meeting with low turn out.
Just as differing frameworks, tactics and objectives divide residents from one another and begin
to explain the lack of an overarching resident coalition, these factors also serve to draw residents
to established coalitions. For example, I met with one resident who is pushing for unlawful re-
occupation of his development. He has found the heartiest supporters not among his fellow
residents, but among the mostly white, mostly middle class members of the community advocacy
faction. The awkwardness of being one of only a small handful of resident members does not
escape him, however. "Somebody's been telling Nagin it's just me and a whole bunch of white
people," he joked, pressing the need to up resident attendance at the planning meeting for a
community advocacy coalition event.
This tension points to the unusual relationship between resident presence and coalitional
credibility. Earlier I cited the perception of insider status as an avenue for coalitions to achieve
legitimacy. Residents are the ultimate insiders. Residents are not only identifiable as bona fide
New Orleanians, they are also insiders to the developments and communities at the very heart of
the public housing conflict.
The incomparable legitimacy residents bring to the table belies the ambiguous value of their
actual participation in decision making and leadership. The token presence of residents' faces is
essential if a coalition hopes to be taken seriously. But little attention is given to the actual
operation and mechanisms for inclusion within a coalition. Allies and critics alike overlook the
lived experiences of HANO residents in favor of their symbolic presence on the podium or in the
press release.
The large value placed on perceived participation operates in sharp contrast to the null value
placed on actual participation. This creates a situation where coalition leadership is actively
courting resident membership, but sometimes guarding leadership and decision making
capabilities. Under the best circumstances this results in a healthy negotiation of priorities and
sharing of power. Otherwise, we see residents taken advantage of because of their lack of
education or ability to navigate bureaucracies, paraded as tokens before politicians and reporters,
and misrepresented by leadership interested in accomplishing coalition goals.
Accusations of opportunism and misrepresentation have been directed with particular frequency
towards the community advocacy faction. On multiple occasions, the community advocates have
come under fire as perpetrators of this sort of exploitation and misrepresentation. One
particularly confrontational African American attorney from the litigation coalition has a history
of personal and professional conflicts with members of the community advocacy faction. At two
separate public housing events he has punched white community advocacy members on the
grounds that they were misrepresenting residents and preventing them from voicing their
perspectives.
Beyond individual conflagrations, a broader public has questioned the coalition's ability to
represent and engage residents. In an interview, a journalist said of the faction "they take
advantage of residents in a desperate and vulnerable situation, and put them in harm's way"
(Interview 5, 2007). A business and preservation coalition member told me their rhetoric
silenced residents and prevented them from developing their own voice and agenda (Interview 1,
2007). And in another interview, a white community advocacy coalition member described a St.
Thomas resident who "charged that we were endangering people of color, that we were putting
people in a dangerous situation" (Interview 3, 2007). These critiques point not only to concerns
about misrepresentation, but also to charges of exploitation.
But while the coalition does not have an adequate representation of residents in its membership,
I've found that leadership is, if not shared, then sometimes divided between residents and non-
residents. The division of the faction into several smaller groups has allowed a single resident-
dominated group to thrive. This group is led by a particular extremely charismatic and dominant
resident activist, giving rise to separate concerns about internal power sharing and dominance.
But in any case, this group is truly resident led.
In the case of the non-resident led segments of the coalition, there remains a relatively safe space
for disagreement, if not fundamental reevaluation of priorities. Disagreement was revealed to me
at the end of a July meeting of community advocacy coalition members which included around
half a dozen residents from a variety of different developments. A white non-resident leader of
the meeting suggested the group demand changes to the pending legislation to call for the
opening of 14,000 rather than 7,000 units. A resident at the meeting disagreed. "I didn't intend to
live in public housing for the rest of my life. If they're reopening and rebuilding public housing,
I want them to build in opportunities. I don't want to be dependent on the system forever. I want
to rent a regular apartment someday, and maybe I want to own a home. I want to be able to do
this in my neighborhood, around my family and my friends."
The white leader remained attached to the group's underlying framework as a guide for its
objectives. She retorted that HANO should re-open all 14,000 units as ACC, that it's just the
right thing to do, and that the dissenting resident is disregarding the needs of current and future
HANO tenants. The resident defended herself, saying "I don't want to be stuck out to the point
where they take everything. You never know, we've got to be realistic right now." Ultimately,
the two agreed to disagree, planned to meet up at a coalition rally the following week, and went
their separate ways. The disagreement illustrated both the different vantage points from which
residents and non-residents are engaging in the public housing debate, but also, and more
relevant to this section, the way in which conflict is addressed in the context of a coalition.
The meaning of resident membership and the politics of their participation and engagement
differ from those of non-resident coalition members, but many of the same considerations guide
their choices. Ultimately, resident allegiance is dictated by the three factors delineated in the last
chapter. As with any of the coalition members, they weigh objectives, frameworks and tactics
and find (or do not find) a coalition that works for them.
Why Do Other Residents Choose Not to Participate At All?
I have identified three central reasons why remaining residents choose not to participate. First,
the majority of residents are still living outside the city. Second, residents in and out of New
Orleans have more immediate and concrete concerns than the long-term future of their
developments. Third, there is diversity of perspective not accounted for in the section above:
surprisingly, some public housing residents are in fact in favor of HANO and HUD's plans to
demolish and redevelop the complexes. And finally, the structure of the anti-demolition effort
does not always facilitate resident participation.
Reticent government agencies make tracking HANO residents' current locations difficult, but by
most accounts New Orleans' public housing tenants are concentrated in Houston. In the
immediate aftermath of Katrina, Houston hosted more evacuees from the New Orleans area
(230,000: around half the city's total population), than any other location. In particular as the
final destination for many of the residents who were unable to evacuate the city, Houston now
houses some of the city's poorest displaced residents. (Gelinas, City Journal, Spring, 2006)
Despite HANO residents' apparent concentration in Houston, many of the relationships that tied
them together in New Orleans have been difficult to sustain in Texas. While many of these
networks remain intact, they are functioning in crisis mode and as such are not easily activated
around political issues not seen as truly imminent. As one community advocate put it, the
"chaos" of Houston is not an ideal environment for information transfer or political or social
organizing (Interview 3, 2007).
The challenge of planning for an absent, uninformed, and non-communicative population is one
that the city as a whole is struggling with. It took over a year and a half, and four large-scale
planning efforts, to produce a single overarching plan for the general rebuilding of New Orleans
(released in spring, 2007 as the Unified New Orleans Plan). Ultimately, despite the best efforts of
all four teams, only 4,000 New Orleanians contributed, comprising less than 1% of the city's
more than 450,000 pre-storm residents (AmericaSpeaks, January 29, 2007).
The general challenge of absence is compounded with public housing residents; cultural, literacy
and socioeconomic barriers make communication and participation truly a puzzle. It is thought
that many evacuated residents living well below the poverty line and in temporary or shared
quarters, lack access to the internet, and perhaps even television. A functional illiteracy rate of up
to 44% (Literacy Alliance of Greater New Orleans, 2001) makes print material an inefficient
way of conveying information. And a long history of disenfranchisement makes many HANO
residents suspicious and reticent when asked to participate in formal institutional processes.
Thus absence characterizes the majority of HANO residents vis a vis the demolition debate.
Whether by geography, by choice or by some sort of barrier to access, most residents are not
weighing in on the issue. This void of voice is one major factor blocking the formation of a vocal
anti-demolition faction made up of former residents.
Even for residents who live in New Orleans and are kept apprised of HANO and HUD's plans to
demolish, often day to day activities are defined by more immediate concerns. After Katrina, the
lives of New Orleanians were torn apart. Like most of the city's population, HANO residents are
often preoccupied with the everyday challenges of putting their lives back together.
While saving public housing was the topic at July, 2007 town hall style meeting called by the
community advocacy faction and attended by half a dozen residents, residents quickly turned the
discussion to more immediate housing concerns. They asked for help discerning letters sent by
the housing authority regarding vouchers, and wanted to know how to get on the waiting list for
the few units in Iberville, Guste and Fischer currently open. They shared stories about the
couches and living room floors they've been sleeping on, and they caught up about mutual
friends and relations. While they cared enough about the long term future of public housing to
attend the meeting, they were so wrapped up in the personal and bureaucratic demands of the
present that they ran out of time to address strategy and objectives in the future.
At another meeting focused on public housing, questions about a job training program took
center stage. Although a resident convener of the meeting remarked that the organization is to
save public housing, not your job, he ultimately ceded the meeting. A woman's complaint about
being unfairly discriminated against by a job training program became the focus. Participants
offered advice and the contact information of the same legal aid attorneys involved in the
litigation faction.
From there, rather than returning to the issue of defense of public housing, the meeting turned to
housing vouchers and family size. A woman who was caring for her three grandchildren offered
advice about how to obtain legal guardianship of foster or grandchildren so that Section 8
voucher eligibility would reflect the true size of a household.
Although all of this seems irrelevant to the public housing debate, these were the most pressing
and relevant concerns in the lives of the residents I encountered. They obviously demonstrated
their interest in the long-term fate of the complexes by showing up to the anti-demolition
meetings. But given the opportunity they also were looking for venues to air their more
immediate concerns. Much more than the often single-minded faction members, public housing
residents are typically people operating on a very tight time and money budget, who--with
limited educational and cultural resources--are actively navigating some of our society's most
complicated bureaucratic systems.
One other component to the issue of personal priorities is the way in which coalitions choose to
structure their activities. For residents who may be extremely overextended, the actual structure
of meetings, actions and events may not be compatible with their lifestyles. For example, I
attended a community advocacy coalition meeting to plan a 4 th of July rally and campout in a
park in front of City Hall in New Orleans. To the radical white activists leading the meeting, the
date would send a strong symbolic message to the city government about its failures in serving
the people of New Orleans. But for the residents present that night, the event was met with
irritation and reluctance. One woman finally said that the Fourth of July was one of the few days
that nearly everybody got off from work, and that people wanted to spend the day with their
friends and families. An exasperated white activist then tried to plan guilt in the residents
present, saying that she didn't understand why they couldn't just show up for a few hours.
The everyday realities that lead some residents to anti-demolition activism and others to focus on
immediate personal concerns, have drawn still others to support HUD and HANO's plans for
demolition and redevelopment. Both the pro and anti-demolition camps claim to represent the
will of the residents; given the contested nature of each camp's claim and any kind of presented
data, and the fact that I focused my research solely on the anti-demolition movement, I have no
way to evaluate what percentage of residents actually support or oppose demolition. But suffice
it to say, there is a pro-demolition strain amongst residents.
This perspective is most often articulated through the remaining vestiges of HANO's pre-storm
resident councils. Prior to Katrina HANO required a democratically elected resident council in
each complex. Ostensibly, these councils acted as resident representatives and liaisons to the
housing authority. They were vested with limited decision making capabilities and each council
member was paid a stipend for his or her service.
According to several resident and non-resident interviewees, these councils were of dubious
legitimacy even then. One community advocacy coalition member confided, "You know the
elections that they use are pretty suspect in how legitimate they are. And other residents don't
want to go along with it. There are residents who hate the tenant councils" (Interview 3, 2007).
And interviewees from every coalition sited poor leadership and misrepresentation by the
resident council as one of the reasons St. Thomas residents ended up with such an unfavorable
deal when their complex was redeveloped.
Today it is unclear how powerful or autonomous councils from shuttered complexes are. Each
development's council consists of different residents with different personalities and reputations;
given the diversity of perspectives among all residents, the positions of the councils certainly
vary to some degree. Nevertheless, activists from across the anti-demolition movement assert
that most councils are operating under the thumb of the housing authority and thus adhere to the
official HANO pro-demolition stance. Representatives from each coalition, as well as several
residents I spoke with derided the tenant councils. "There's some that are, especially leadership,
they're ready to cut any rotten deal for redevelopment," remarked a community advocacy faction
member (Interview 3, 2007).
In any case, trust in resident councils, HANO, HUD or the stated plans for demolition and
redevelopment should not be discounted as reasons for the lack of anti-demolition organizing
among former residents. As mentioned earlier, the scope of this research prevents me from
guessing what percentage of residents support or oppose demolition. But undoubtedly there is a
certain amount of diversity even on this question.
Conclusion
In the wake of Katrina, the entire city is struggling with the challenges of multi-stakeholder
decision making when all the stakeholders are not present or vocal. This challenge looms large in
the New Orleans public housing neighborhoods, where some of the city's poorest, most
politically marginalized people lived.
The absence of a unified resident faction in the anti-demolition movement is a testament to both
the organizing challenges, and also the divergent perspectives around the issue. While the
absence of a dedicated faction does not preclude resident voice entirely, it diffuses it across
multiple coalitions. Residents find themselves in a bizarre situation, where their nominal
participation in any coalition (against demolition, or in favor of it) is essential to establishing the
group's credibility, but where their authentic participation or leadership is not particularly
necessary. This requires the residents who are involved to be more vigilant against tokenism and
misrepresentation.
In the worst case scenario, residents are misrepresented and exploited as symbolic tokens. In
other cases there is space for discussion. Ultimately, however, they are beholden to coalitional
majorities in every case made up of non-residents. Nevertheless, insofar as coalitions are
organized around common frameworks, tactics and objectives, residents who find good fits in
these criteria have a chance of finding fellow coalition members with common perspectives and
approaches.
The issue of representation remains unsolved and residents continue to make up only a small
portion of coalition membership. Nevertheless, the three coalitions are the loudest and most
powerful voices in the fight to save public housing. While there is much for residents to lose in
participation, for some the risk of not participating in these established coalitions outweighs any
possible hazards.
Chapter Five: Conclusion
My research set out to investigate cross-race, cross-class participation in the anti-demolition
movement. Despite the appearance of diversity, however, I found very limited participation on
the part of public housing residents themselves. Few residents were involved in any capacity in
the anti-demolition effort, and those who were involved were typically not active in leadership or
decision making. They often functioned as token members, lending legitimacy to the work of
each coalition. Moreover, I didn't find a movement at all, but rather three disparate coalitions
whose mutual opposition to the demolition of public housing constitutes a short term intersection
of interests, rather than a shared long term agenda.
Despite the absence of an overarching movement, these three groups are respectively tied to at
least four larger movements or initiatives. The community advocacy coalition situates itself
within a larger anti-capitalist movement. The litigation coalition is working to accomplish a
mission put forth by the civil rights movement. Preservationists are at the intersection of a
grassroots movement begun at neighborhood and city levels, and a nationwide political project
that has been evolving for years; their strategy relies on creating legal and procedural processes
regulating land and building uses and changes. And business interests are oriented towards the
economic recovery of New Orleans' business community. While this does not constitute a
movement given the absence of a transformative agenda, it is an overarching initiative with a
long range objective distinct from the public housing issue.
As such, amongst themselves the coalitions are without a unified strategy for engagement of
diverse stakeholders. They lack the urgent imperative to reach out to either other coalitions or
hard to reach residents. Protecting public housing and helping residents to reoccupy units is not
an end, but rather a means, a step in a larger narrative of class-based revolution, urban economic
recovery, or precedent setting in preservation or civil rights law. Their long-run interests don't
necessarily lie in the long-term work of empowering residents and building leadership, but rather
in using the demolition win to advance their respective ends. And so, the coalitions are as
ineffective at engaging meaningful resident participation in the activism as they are at
collaborating across the coalitional boundaries.
This ambivalence towards participation is only one of the many obstacles to engagement that
plague not just public housing but most rebuilding processes in post-Katrina New Orleans. In
addition to the widespread absence of residents across the city, decision-making at every scale
faces an urgent schedule, limited financial and technical assistance, a citywide leadership base
that are caught up in rebuilding their own lives, and an enormous task. In the case of public
housing, this means that residents will remain exiled to Houston until decisions about their
communities in New Orleans are made; in the meantime advocates will race against HUD and
HANO's wrecking ball, rallying their limited resources, supporters and staff to save four public
housing developments at once-an enormously challenging task.
Concerns over planning for, rather than planning with stakeholders have been expressed since at
least the 1960s. Bolan's discussion of the culture of planning finishes by warning practitioners to
pay special attention to the distribution of costs and benefits resulting from a given policy
decision. Unchecked, he warns, decision making processes generally favor those who have "the
most resources, occupy a faborable position in the decision-making structure, possess the best
skills in negotiating decision outcomes, and have the capacity for developing the best tactics and
modes of influencing behavior" (Bolan, 1969, 304).
Sherry Anstein expands on the impact of decision-making structures and the nature of
participation. She offers a hierarchy of participatory models, ranging in effect from the empty
rituals of nonparticipation to processes that generate real citizen power. According to her ladder
of participation, New Orleans public housing residents fall somewhere between tokenism and
nonparticipation (Arnstein, 1969).
But despite Arnstein's valuation of some methods of participation as more authentic or
inauthentic, are there ever constraints that limit the type of participation that is possible? The
public housing debate in New Orleans is an extreme example of a constrained situation. On one
side, HANO residents lack many of the resources that support participation. They are without
money and transportation, they have inflexible work schedules, many lack basic skills such as
literacy necessary to access information and participate in certain kinds of discussions, and they
have a mistrustful relationship to HANO and to bureaucratic processes. On the other side, the
three disparate coalitions lack the cohesiveness or the imperative to generate a participation and
engagement strategy. Rather than focusing on facilitating participation, they focus on the
urgency of the public housing battle and on accomplishing the goals of their respective
movements and initiatives.
Archon Fung argues that these constraints are not insurmountable obstacles. Using case studies
from community schools and policing in Chicago, he refutes both the Strong Egalitarianism and
Strong Rational Choice models. Strong Egalitarianism refers to the argument that people lacking
social or material resources will be less able and less likely to participate in public processes than
people who have ample resources. Strong Rational Choice theory argues that individuals are
cognizant of their objectives, and that they act, speak and vote strategically towards achieving
these goals. The theory contends that deliberation across diverse interest groups does not lead to
a mutually satisfactory conclusion, but rather leads to watered down outcomes reliant upon
lowest common denominators.
Fung uses examples from a community policing program and a community led schools program
in Chicago to argue against a Strong Egalitarianism model. He finds that in poor neighborhoods
with high crime rates more residents attend community policing meetings than in more well off
neighborhoods with lower crime rates. Similarly, he finds that in poor neighborhoods with low
school performance, a greater number of parents run for local school council positions than in
wealthier neighborhoods with higher performance levels. Based on these observations, Fung
contends that given sufficient impetus for action, low income levels to not necessarily amount to
low levels of participation.
Fung's arguments hold up within the context of his case studies from Chicago, but post-Katrina
New Orleans is a very different place. New Orleans' public housing residents certainly have a
strong impetus to participate. Whereas failing schools and high crime rates pushed poor
Chicagoans into action, HANO residents face the possible demolition of their homes, and
permanent exclusion from their city. But while the stakes are higher in New Orleans, the dearth
of resources among poor black HANO tenants is also more profound. Residents struggle not only
with low incomes but in many cases they also live in distant cities without access to
transportation, separated from the social and political networks of home. Many HANO residents
also lack literacy and other skills necessary to engage in a struggle against a bureaucracy.
Planners have highlighted the importance of these capacity gaps since the neighborhood planning
programs of the 1960s (Arnstein, 1969; Bolan, 1969), and the decades since have also
spotlighted the lack of trust in public institutions as an alienating, isolating force in civic life
(Putnam, 2000). Given these constraints, even in the face of demolition most residents are unable
or uninterested in participating in the anti-demolition effort.
Fung also argues against the Strong Rational Choice theory. The theory assumes that individuals
enter into deliberation with fixed interests which they will strategically argue for. As a result,
Strong Rational Choice posits that the results of attempts at deliberation are: low overall
participation rates, unconstrained pursuit of individual preferences, and ultimately a failure to
change anyone's mind. Consensus, the theory asserts, is simply arrival at a lowest common
denominator that aggregates participants' perspectives, but does not accurately reflect what
people actually want or care about.
Fung accedes that deliberative processes often have low levels of overall participation. He
argues, however, that smaller groups--so long as they are representative of the range of
community perspectives--are sometimes the best venues for productive decision making,
allowing serious contribution and discussion from all participants. Through his cases, he shows
that with strong facilitators and willing parties, deliberative processes can actually make progress
and lead to outcomes that satisfy a variety of interests.
Again, I question the viability of deliberation in the New Orleans context. Existing coalitions
come with interests and objectives that are deeply entrenched in their respective movements or
initiatives. Their involvement in these larger agendas means they have a past, a future, and a way
to contextualize the current struggle, with or without deliberation with residents or with other
coalitions. Coalition leadership lacks the will to deliberate. Without the will, a deliberative
process would lack enthusiastic participants from among the coalitions, strong facilitation, and
the outreach necessary to engage residents.
Fung tells compelling stories, but they do not hold up to a city in New Orleans' position. Social
science research dealing specifically with public housing is another literature to mine for
similarities. In comparing and contrasting public and private life, community organizing, and
demolition struggles, in HANO developments and other public housing communities can we find
useful parallels? Sudhir Venkatesh's (2000) description of decline in Chicago's Robert Taylor
Homes tells a story of an evolving physical and social terrain, controlled from the outside by
government agencies and the shifting wills of local and federal policy makers, and from the
inside by tenant leaders, rival gangs and the deteriorating buildings themselves. And both
Rhonda Williams (2004) in Baltimore and Roberta Feldman and Susan Stall (2004) in Chicago
tell more interior stories of possibility rather than despair amid female-centric worlds where the
notion of a household encompasses one's larger public housing community and where extant
bureaucratic structures foster--at times through attention, at other times through neglect--the
politicization of tenants.
In recollections of public housing before the storm, we can hear echoes of these other cases in
New Orleans. Residents contrast how familiar (even familial) public housing communities could
feel, against the fear associated with gang warfare, and the frustration and sense of exclusion
resulting from hostile public policy and deteriorating buildings. But for all the parallels between
HANO developments and public housing elsewhere, it is difficult to say how significant this past
is to the present, and will be to the future. The physical and social geography of New Orleans has
changed. Public housing residents are physically absent. The developments are vacant. And the
communities once bounded by these physical locations are scattered and detached. As the
developments hang in the balance, so too do the aggregated experiences and collective voices of
their communities.
These voices, absent from the activist scene for now, are the ones we hear rising from grassroots
struggles in public housing developments in other cities. In New Orleans they are replaced by an
anti-demolition movement that operates in the opposite direction. Agency officials and civil
rights attorneys engage in public battles in federal court, white activists are swarmed by the
SWAT team while re-occupying developments, and the New York Times runs lengthy anti-
demolition articles designed to appeal to movers and shakers with aesthetic interest in the
housing. Meanwhile residents without television, internet, and in many cases basic literacy skills,
remain evacuated and without information about and access to the conflict at hand. Unlike other
cities where residents are the catalysts and major players in public housing struggles, many
residents in New Orleans are not even aware of the political battle occurring.
However, while the anti-demolition coalitions are not engaging diverse stakeholders as
participants and leaders currently, an extended time table may tell a different story. Obviously,
for practitioners concerned about engagement, the current situation is less than ideal. But on the
other hand, there will be no opportunity for meaningful resident participation in the next chapter
of public housing if the anti-demolition effort, however non-participatory in terms of the resident
role, fails in opposition to HUD and HANO's plans. There will be no conflict over the fate of
public housing or discussion of how to reclaim it from decline (Vale, 2002), only demolition
dates.
Furthermore, until public housing or some other local option is made available, public housing
residents not only remain separated from their developments, but scattered from their
communities and the opportunity to develop coherent collective voices on the issue. Shared
experiential space is one of the bonds that defines the residents of any neighborhood as a
community. For many HANO tenants, Katrina has broken this bond, leaving residents separated,
isolated and consumed with the immediacy of everyday concerns. Given these constraints, it's
unclear to how effective even the best efforts to organize and engage residents could be.
It's important to note that there are certainly some efforts to mobilize along existing social
networks among evacuee populations. However, this organizing has not significantly linked up
with the anti-demolition effort. With few exceptions, the anti-demolition effort interacts solely
with residents who live in or near New Orleans.
The movement's focus on halting demolition and allowing residents to return to their homes
could ultimately prove a more pivotal step towards empowering residents, than would an
extensive outreach effort to scattered displaced tenants. A victory in preventing demolition
would not only allow residents to return to the locations that constitute them as a community, it
would also allow them to develop a collective voice. Finally, beyond re-constituting scattered
communities, re-opening public housing in the immediate term would more significantly to
expand the time period in which decisions are being made. With residents physically occupying
units, HANO would have to work harder and certainly longer to justify demolition. An expanded
timeframe also would increase the possibility of, and the necessity for resident participation.
However, turning this opportunity for participation into an authentic space for leadership and
empowerment would depend upon the structure of the debate as it goes forward.
As of August, 2007 only two anti-demolition groups have long range objectives that expressly
affect public housing residents, and only one group states an intent to actively engage these
residents. The community advocacy coalition states, among its longer range goals, re-opening all
14,000 pre-1990 units of New Orleans public housing, thereby doubling the city's pre-Katrina
public housing stock reserved for extremely low income renters. Despite this plan to help the
poor, the coalition has articulated no specific provisions for participation, on the part of current
or prospective HANO residents, in planning the rehabilitation and re-occupancy.
Only the business interests build such participation into their long range plan. They hope to re-
open enough pre-Katrina units to accommodate all families wishing to return home, and then to
engage in a planning process that includes residents, neighborhoods abutting developments,
business interests and public officials to re-envision public housing. Although they describe
participation, they also plan to enter any process with the pre-existing long range objectives of
decreasing current density in the developments, requiring enrollment in job training and financial
fitness courses for residents to move them towards market rate renting or homeownership, and
time limits on resident stays in public housing. The latter requirements have been centerpieces of
conservative reform proposals for public housing for years now. The business coalition's central
interest in the reoccupation of public housing is to generate "workforce housing," in the current
policy shorthand, for the low-wage, low-skill workers who populate the service economy in New
Orleans.
It is difficult to know how the three coalitions' stated mid and long-term objectives will impact
the empowerment or-conversely-the continued marginalization of resident voices.
Furthermore, assuming the return of residents themselves, there are wide-ranging objectives and
interests present in resident communities--some of which existed and were articulated prior to
Katrina, but many of which were shaped by Katrina but have yet to surface in public debate.
Additionally, even with a push for resident participation from residents themselves and from one
or more of the current anti-demolition groups, successful participation in the vein of Fung's
(2004) accountable autonomy will likely require several key conditions he and others call for.
Supportive government agencies (in this case HUD and HANO) must be willing to open
channels for participation and resident influence on decision making. Although HANO had
designated resident councils prior to the storm, as mentioned earlier they lacked credibility
among many members. Creating a legitimate avenue for resident leadership would mark a
significant step towards enabling authentic leadership opportunities for residents. Briggs (2003)
emphasizes the importance of support roles in strategic, well-structured participatory planning,
and so does Fung in his comparison of deliberative democracy across Chicago neighborhoods,
some of which struggled mightily to sustain citizen participation or to be productive where they
did sustain it. The addition of strong facilitation and analysis would help diverse stakeholders
work through their differences. And organizing--both within public housing communities, and
within other stakeholder communities--would help to identify affected parties and provide them
with useful and accessible information. Finally, Briggs (2003, 8) argues for a participation
strategy that supports stakeholders in determining: the why of participation (its purposes, given
the context and timing of a planning effort); the who (the players and their roles, given the
purposes); the what (the issues and authority scope, given purposes and players); and the how
(the tactics, given purposes, players and scope). Launching an inclusive participatory process
around New Orleans public housing would be an enormous challenge. But if it was successful it
would truly break ground in terms of deliberation and consensus building in a highly constrained
situation, and in a place as fraught with histories and tensions as New Orleans.
Obviously, a process that incorporates authentic participation has many pre-requisites, most
notably time. In the context of this analysis, I set out to investigate whether the anti-demolition
effort thus far is working to engage diverse perspectives and leadership from across race and
class boundaries. The answer was "no" or, more generously, "not yet," which hints at the need
for a longer-range evaluation of the question. While resident voices are marginal in the current
politics, the effect of a victory (the preservation of public housing) has the potential to
dramatically expand participation and leadership opportunities. While New Orleans elites
advocating for the interests of residents is a far cry from a resident-led movement, in the face of
formidable enemies, an urgent timetable and widespread resident displacement, this advocacy
may ultimately be better than any available alternative. And while this thesis examines the
current politics of opposition and its players, the anti-demolition effort may take years to reveal
itself as a fundamentally inclusive or exclusive struggle. My findings capture the fascinating first
chapter.
Appendix
Unabridged Table Outlining Characteristics of Coalitions
Community Advocacy Litigation Business and Preservation
Groups Two small grassroots groups Three civil rights law Preservationists, Treme/Lafitte
organizations area business owners,
hospitality business owners,
members of prominent political
families
History Activism around public The federal court case against In recognition of an unusual
housing emerged from an HANO and HUD was filed in intersection of interests, this
anti-war group that emerged June, 2006 by attorneys from group started to meet to
from the anti-death penalty the three organizations. All strategize about how this odd
movement. Initially an anti three of these organizations assortment of players not
war group and a public have histories working for the typically interested in public
housing advocacy group rights of poor people, women housing policy could strategize.
worked together to defend and minorities. Each came from a very
the Iberville development, different social and ideological
but since the storm attention background, but together they
has shifted to defending the agreed that preventing HANO
four units currently under and HUD from demolishing
threat: St. Bernard, Lafitte, extant public housing was
C.J. Peete and B.W. Cooper. essential for the uplift of the
city.
Framework The anti-death penalty Civil rights, fair housing, Overall they come together
movement, from which the public interest law, around urban uplift. The
group emerged, was strongly business owners think that
rooted at the intersection of public housing residents (as
Catholicism and social both employees and
justice. The anti-war branch consumers) are an essential
of this coalition primarily component to the local
focused on an anti- economy. The politicos and
globalization, anti-capitalism public intellectuals view the
agenda. When it spawned the public housing residents as an
housing advocacy group, and essential demographic presence
especially since the storm, in the city--culturally. The
the focus has shifted to preservationists view the
building a class-based buildings as an essential piece
movement with which to of the urban fabric. There is a
overthrow capitalism, and lot of diversity of framework,
helping people see the but all centered around a vision
linkages between U.S. for urban uplift.
foreign policy and the wars
waged abroad, and the
government's war against the
poor and people of color
waged at home.
Long-Term In their combined capacity The long term objectives of Economic and urban recovery.
Objectives the anti-war and the housing these legal aid organizations is
advocacy group are working to ensure equal protection
towards building a broad under the laws, civil rights
class-based movement that regardless of race, class or
will eventually replace our income, and equal access to
current exploitative capitalist legal representation for poor
system. Towards this end, and otherwise marginalize
they are fighting for a long populations
term expansion of publicly
provided goods and services.
Short-/mid- In the immediate term, the In the immediate term, these For business interests, bringing
Term coalition is working to organizations are interested I back public housing residents
Objectives prevent demolition and to protecting the renters' rights as workers and buyers. For
immediately re-open all pre- for the former residents of preservationists, preventing
storm ACC units. In the mid- HANO developments. In the changes to the historical fabric
term, the group hopes to mid-term, these attorneys of the city by blocking
return the city's ACC want to ensure resident voice demolition of the
housing stock to its pre 1990 in any planning effort, a developments. For politicos
levels (from about 7,000 pre- guarantee of one for one and public intellectuals, an
storm to a level of about replacement, and a rolling immediate return of residents
14,000). Ultimately, they redevelopment strategy or and a long term strategy for
believe in the fundamental some comparable approach restructuring of the institution
structure of the current public which would assure no to prevent crime and social ills,
housing program, and are displacement and maximum to limit residential tenure, and
working towards an choice for HANO renters to generate opportunities for
expansion of that rather than residents.
any type of fundamental
restructuring.
Tactics This coalition believes that This coalition's tactics revolve Pushing on public and political
the time for negotiation is around litigation. Their opinion, calling in favors from
over, and that the best bet for relationship to all parties is the press and elected officials,
advocates of poor people and defined by the law. Their lobbying, lawsuits, expert
people of color is direct relationship to residents is that opinions.
action instead of of attorneys to clients. Also,
compromise. They rely the clinic makes itself broadly
extensively on rallies, pickets available as a public interest
and civil disobedience. They law firm so that residents can
also frequently march to the call upon the attorney's there
offices and homes of officials for a wide variety of legal
and formally denounce both support, not simply around the
political and civil society pending public housing case.
figures in New Orleans and
the nation whom they see as
a threat to their movement.
Interest This coalition sees the public Civil rights, law clinic The buildings are an essential
housing struggle in New opportunities for students part of New Orleans history, or
Orleans as part of their larger the people are an essential
socialist battle, and they see component of the cultural and
residents as an integral part economic life of the city.
of their class-based
grassroots base.
Image This coalition is typically Three lawyers in particular are This group is low profile but
perceived as a group of the faces of the legal fight highly influential. They are
middle-class white hippies, over public housing. Although largely unknown by the public
who are politically radical at they are all highly educated, and somewhat mistrusted by
best, reactionary, impractical, there is the perception that the activists. There are some
unpredictable and unrealistic two New Orleanian African- members who have really
at worst. American lawyers understand divisive personalities, and thus
everyday struggles, and the they are not always able to
one older white attorney has cooperate with other coalitions,
been such a stalwart and but that said they are largely
reliable advocate that he's respected and appreciated by
gained credibility among other advocates, if not
those who might have leveled necessarily trusted.
criticism. This legal
powerhouse is perceived as
the peoples' law firm. They
are highly accessible,
ubiquitous when it comes to
civil rights challenges, highly
rational but also ceaselessly
committed.
Membership Coalition's leadership is Attorneys, law-students, Politically prominent figures,
dominated by middle-class experts, a few plaintiffs public intellectuals, business
white leadership, but the interests, preservationists,
rank-and-file membership journalists, a few residents
does include a handful of
residents, and many younger
mostly white activists who
make up the reliable base for
actions and civil
disobedience.
Meetings While dominated by white The office is relatively The group holds weekly public
members, the group does accessible, with attorney's meetings but they tend to be
hold weekly meetings personal numbers widely low profile. They do not
centrally located adjacent to available. The battle itself provide resources, nor are they
the Iberville development on though is largely taking place direct action oriented.
Rampart. These are well in a realm of experts. As it
attended by a variety of says on the very first page of
people, and while the the suit, the perspectives of a
organization's agenda is limited number of plaintiffs
oriented towards a particular will stand in for those of all
radical vision of wide scale residents, and the outcomes of
change, the meetings the decisions for these few
themselves cater to the needs will set a precedent for the
of the participants. They rest.
provide, in addition to
information about the latest
developments with regard to
demolition and other housing
decisions, a sort of
caseworker environment
where if residents are
struggling to attain services
or assistance, the well
resourced, well connected,
and highly bureaucratically
literate leadership can
support them in attaining the
help they need.
Mandate Their mandate comes from the
notion of the law and of civil
rights and their need for
defense.
The group makes two
somewhat contradictory
arguments for their mandate
for their work. The first is
that public housing is a
public good, and thus every
member of the public
(including the middle-class
white leadership of the
organization) has the right
and the obligation to
advocate for its presence. The
other argument is that the
group is advocating not just
for the demands and agenda
of its leadership, but arguing
on behalf of and representing
the poor African American
residents who are not able to
be present in the city because
of the displacement, and also
arguing on behalf of the
people who were on HANO's
waiting list at the time of the
storm.
The organization claims to
have its finger on the pulse of
resident desires. It argues that
contrary to city and non-
profit assessments the
majority of public housing
resident want to come home
to the developments they
lived in before, want to
continue living in traditional
public housing, and have not
in fact found unparalleled
opportunities and comfort in
the cities that have hosted
them as evacuees.
As middle-class whites they
cannot represent the
perspectives of residents.
Their overarching anti-
capitalist agenda is
alienating. Their inflexibility
about goals and tactics
prevents cooperation.
As concerned citizens,
interested business owners and
somewhat resourced
community leaders they have
the right and the obligation to
involve themselves in an issue
that will so dramatically affect
the cultural and economic life
of the city.
Residents are viewed as
demographic units, rather than
as individuals or wronged
parties.
They do not involve resident
voice. There are divisive, non-
cooperative members. The
coalition only values residents
as economic contributors and
only values the development as
a collection of historic
buildings.
Residents deserve choices and
rights under the law.
Residents
Critique
Figure A.1
The advancement project, as
an outside body has been met
with some skepticism. One
attorney, as a member of a
highly contentious family, is a
political lightening rod. And
another attorney's decision to
defend William Jefferson
damages her political
credibility among some
(though bolsters it among
others, including residents)
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